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Abstract
We conduct a field experiment in 31 primary schools in England to test the effec-
tiveness of different temporary incentives on increasing choice and consumption of
fruit and vegetables at lunchtime. In each treatment, pupils received a sticker for
choosing a fruit or vegetable at lunch. They were eligible for an additional reward
at the end of the week depending on the number of stickers accumulated, either
individually (individual scheme) or in comparison to others (competition). Overall,
we find no significant effect of the individual scheme, but positive effects of com-
petition. For children who had margin to increase their consumption, competition
increases choice of fruit and vegetables by 33% and consumption by 48%. These
positive effects generally carry over to the week immediately following the treat-
ment, but are not sustained effects six months later. We also find large differences
in effectiveness across demographic characteristics such as age and gender.
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1. Introduction
Poor nutrition is a primary cause behind the rising cost of health care in many developed
countries.1 According to the World Health Organization (2009) poor nutrition is related
to three of the five highest risks for mortality in the world: high blood pressure; high
blood glucose; and overweight and obesity. In response, policy makers have been push-
ing information interventions, such as the “5-a-day” campaign in the UK, to encourage
people to develop better eating habits. However, the success of these campaigns has been
moderate.2
This paper investigates how to incentivize school age children to consume healthier
food. Recent evidence shows that incentives can motivate people to exercise (Charness and
Gneezy (2009), Acland and Levy (2013)), lose weight (Cawley and Price (2013), Horwitz
et al. (2013), Jeffery (2012)) and eat more fruit and vegetables (Just and Price (2013),
Loewenstein et al. (2016)). While the evidence is encouraging, it remains an open question
which incentives work best and for whom. We are particularly interested in changing the
behaviour of two key groups: boys and children from low socioeconomic backgrounds.
Both groups have been shown to have less healthy diets and are particularly resistant to
change (see Belot and James (2011), Muller et al. (2005), Perry et al. (1998) and Kelder
et al. (1995)). We use insights from behavioural economics to investigate whether we can
improve the intake of healthy foods overall and for these groups in particular by providing
incentives to select fruit and vegetables during school lunches.
We conduct a randomized field experiment in 31 primary schools across England and
implement, for four weeks, two incentive schemes: an individual based incentive and a
competitive incentive. Our sample includes classes in year 2 (pupils aged 6-7) and in year
5 (pupils aged 10-11) to be able to investigate effects by age. In each treatment pupils
were given a sticker for choosing or bringing in a fruit or vegetable at lunch. At the end of
the week (Friday afternoon after lunch), each pupil had the opportunity to pick a larger
prize. In the individual incentive scheme, if a pupil collected four stickers during the week
she or he was allowed to choose a prize. In the competition, children were assigned to
random groups of four, and only the pupil with the most stickers in each group was able
to select a prize from the reward box. In the case of a tie, all children with the highest
number of stickers in the group were eligible for a prize. The groups were revealed after
lunch at the end of the week so children would not engage in strategic behaviour.
1See Cawley (2015) for an overview of the costs of obesity.
2See Ciliska et al. (2000) for a review of many community based interventions. They appear to have
been successful at informing people but have had less success in changing actual behaviour (see Robertson
(2008) and Verplanken and Wood (2006)).
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Using incentives to encourage healthy eating is a controversial idea. Indeed, there
is evidence showing that rewarding children for eating fruit and vegetables can lead to
those items being less preferred (using self-reports as a measure of preference (Birch et.
al. (1982), Birch et. al. (1984), and Newman and Taylor. (1992)). The idea of using
a competition rather than an individual incentive is inspired by the recent evidence in
behavioural economics showing that men tend to be more competitive than women (see
Gneezy et. al (2003), Gneezy and Rustichini (2004), and Booth and Nolen (2012)).
To the best of our knowledge, competitive incentives have not yet been studied in the
consumption of fruit and vegetables in the context of nutrition. While this might have
potential to increase the consumption of fruit and vegetables, it also has the threat of
being effective only for boys or more competitive children while discouraging others. We
are primarily interested in the effects for immediate food intake, but also look at the
build-up of short and long-run health habits once incentives are removed.
We find that the competitive scheme works well overall, with no negative effects for
any subgroup. The results of individual incentives are mixed, and the scheme has no
overall effect. The competitive treatment is more effective for all demographic groups
and, overall, is nearly three times as effective at getting children to consume a portion
of fruit or vegetable at lunch. If we focus on the specific group of children who did not
consume fruit and vegetables every day before the intervention started, we find that the
competitive scheme increases their likelihood of trying a fruit or vegetable at lunch by
48%.
Our second important finding is that incentives do not work in the same way for every-
one. We find that, in general, girls, pupils from poorer socioeconomic backgrounds, and
younger children respond more positively to competition than to the individual based in-
centive. The individual based incentive even appears to have a negative effect on younger
children. Other subgroups, such as boys, older children, and pupils from wealthier so-
cioeconomic backgrounds respond positively to the competitive treatment, although the
estimated effect is not significantly different from the individual scheme. Using a com-
petitive incentive could improve effectiveness by increasing the choice and consumption
among those groups that typically do not respond to health interventions.
The results presented in this paper are directly relevant for policy. We show that
incentives do work in encouraging healthy dietary choices, at least in the short term. The
differential effects by subgroup suggest that health incentives need to be evaluated at the
individual level and, consequently, different policies may have to be developed for different
subgroups or an incentive scheme other than the standard individual scheme may have to
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be considered. Furthermore, increasing the length of time an intervention is taking place
is not the only way policy makers can increase the likelihood that positive behaviours are
adopted: for instance, competitions could be more effective than individual based schemes
at changing behaviour in the same time period.
The remaining part of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we discuss the
related literature. Section 3 presents the experimental design and Section 4 presents a
simple conceptual framework and hypotheses that guide the analysis of the results. We
present the results in Section 5 and conclude in Section 6.
2. Background and related literature
The most related paper to our work is by Just and Price (2013), who tested various indi-
vidual incentive schemes in fifteen schools in two districts in Utah. They incentivized fruit
and vegetable consumption at lunch over a span of two or three weeks. They compare
the effectiveness of various individual incentive schemes (piece rate monetary payment,
lottery, nickel - which were either immediate or delayed). While they find positive sig-
nificant effects during the intervention period, they do not find evidence of medium run
effects (they followed up for four weeks after the incentive was removed). In a follow-up
study, Loewenstein et al. (2016) keep the incentive (a token with a value of 25 cents that
could be redeemed at the school shop, school carnival, or book fair) constant but vary the
length of time the incentives are in place (three or five weeks). They find the effect of the
incentive persisted two months after it had been removed and the consumption rate was
higher for the schools where the intervention lasted 5 weeks.
Our experiment has important design differences when compared to the two aforemen-
tioned studies. First, we incentivize choice of fruit and vegetables. Second, we compare
individual and competitive schemes while they focused only on individual schemes. Third,
we use a longer incentive period than Just and Price (2013). Fourth, we introduce a weekly
prize that is relatively larger in value than our daily prizes. This means the incentive at
the daily level is not independent of choices made on other days of the week. Finally,
Loewenstein et al. (2016) did not have a control group, which, as we will see in our anal-
ysis, turned out to be important when estimating the longer term effects in our study;
consumption of fruit and vegetables appears to follow an upward trend for our control
group. Below, we will discuss our experimental design in detail and compare our findings
to these two closely related studies.
More generally, our paper relates to the literature on behavioural anomalies underlying
‘unhealthy’ behaviours. Present-biased (hyperbolic) preferences, such as those discussed
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in Laibson (1997) and O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999), can explain unhealthy dietary
choices despite an individual being fully aware of the effects of poor nutrition and the
benefits of healthy eating: individuals may overweight the initial costs of eating healthier
and (or) underweight the longer term benefits. In that context, using a temporary and
effective incentive scheme to encourage healthier eating among children could lead to long
term dietary habit changes.3 Interestingly for our study, recent work has shown that
boys, younger children, and children from poorer socioeconomic backgrounds are more
impatient than other children;4 this could explain why children with those demographic
characteristics are less likely to make healthy dietary choices. In that context, providing
immediate incentives to eat healthily may prove to be a powerful tool to get these groups
to respond.
Few studies compare the effectiveness of different interventions on changing diet be-
havior. List and Samek (2015) have looked at the effects of information only campaigns
versus information campaigns coupled with individual based incentives and found the lat-
ter to be more effective. However, a number of studies in the weight-loss literature have
used two or more treatment arms. These, for example, include comparing the use of indi-
vidual, group, lottery-based, and deposit contracts (see Jeffery (2012), John et al.(2011),
Kullgren et al. (2013), and Volpp et al. (2008)).
There is a well-established literature showing that boys tend to be more competitive
than girls (see Gneezy et. al (2003), Gneezy and Rustichini (2004), and Booth and
Nolen (2012)) yet the effect of competitive incentives on health-related behaviors (and
specifically nutrition) has yet to be examined. However, Kullgren et al. (2013) use an
incentive scheme similar to our competitive one in a weight loss study. They do not label
their scheme as competitive, they call it a group incentive, but it has similar features to
our competition scheme. Participants were placed into groups of 5, the identities of the
other 4 individuals were not revealed. The $500 incentive was split among participants
in each group whose weight loss was below their monthly target.
The choice of subgroups to focus on is inspired by Belot and James (2011), who
evaluated the effects of the Jamie Oliver “Feed Me Better Campaign” in England, which
consisted of improving the nutritious quality of school meals. They evaluated the effects
of the campaign on educational outcomes and found that boys and children from lower
socioeconomic background responded less (or later) to the campaign. As mentioned in
3Work by Kelder et. al. (1994), Resnicow et. al. (1998), and Singer et. al. (1995) suggest that
dietary habits appear to form in childhood and track into adulthood.
4See Delaney and Doyle (2012) for children from poorer socioeconomic backgrounds and Bettinger
and Slonim (2007) for boys versus girls, and for older children versus younger ones.
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the introduction, there is a fair amount of evidence showing that these subgroups tend to
respond less to health interventions.
Both of our treatments also relate to the idea of gamification, which is the introduction
of game playing into non-game areas in order to make them more enjoyable and engaging.
Hamari et al. (2014) review the empirical literature on gamification. Out of the twenty-
four papers, though, they only review one that focuses on health.
3. Experimental Design
We conducted a field experiment in England to examine and compare the effectiveness of
a competitive and individual based scheme. We recruited schools in a three step process.
First, we approached all 150 Local Education Authorities (LEAs) in England to ask if
they would be interested in participating; 22 responded positively. Second, we provided
more information about the project to LEAs that responded and set up meetings with
them to answer questions and discuss how to recruit schools. We indicated to LEAs
that we were interested in testing and comparing the effectiveness of incentives schemes
at increasing choice and consumption of fruit or vegetables at lunchtime and that the
interventions were specifically designed to target children who were generally considered
unresponsive to health interventions. Twelve LEAs agreed to let us approach their schools
and provided a list of at least three schools that would consider being involved. Finally,
we approached all 46 schools suggested by the LEAs; 31 of them agreed to participate.
A companion paper, Belot and James (2016), documents the selection process by
which local authorities and schools chose to participate in this experiment. They find that,
overall, out of 30 variables, the only significant difference between LEAs that participate in
the experiment and those that do not is that those who participate have more schools. This
suggests that our sample of LEAs is largely representative of the population. Table B1
has descriptive statistics of the LEAs that participate, LEAs that collaborate (responded
to recruiting attempts) but do not have schools which eventually participate, and LEAs
that did not collaborate (did not respond). It could be the case that LEAs with more
schools participated because they found it easier to provide the names of at least three
schools. Furthermore, to examine things at the school level, Table B2 compares schools
in the experimental sample to schools that we approached but did not take part. There
are no significant differences between schools that agreed to participate and those who
did not.
We recruited children from year two (aged 6 and 7) and year five (aged 9 and 10) in
participating schools. Parents were provided with information about the study, asked to
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fill out a questionnaire, and were required to give consent to have data collected about
their child. As agreed with the schools, all children in year two and five were included
in the project. However, data about choice and consumption of fruit or vegetables were
only recorded for children whose parents gave permission. Parents also filled out a survey
and provided additional background information. We do not have personal, background,
or choice and consumption information for the other pupils. Overall, 15.85% were not
included in the analysis due to the absence of parental consent; we have data on 638
children.
Randomization
We randomly allocated schools to one of three groups: control; competition; or individual
incentive. We were particularly careful to make sure that, ex ante, the average school in
each group had roughly the same number of children and looked similar in terms of school
characteristics.
Within LEA, schools were randomly assigned to treatment arms such that the overall
sample was balanced based on observables. For the purpose of balancing the three groups
we used the following characteristics: (i) proportion of female pupils; (ii) number of pupils;
(iii) number of pupils in class groups (year 2 and year 5);5 (iv) proportion of children
eligible for free school meals; (v) proportion of children eating free school meals; (vi)
per pupil expenditure; (vii) per pupil expenditure on catering; (viii) percent of children
achieving level 4 in both English and Mathematics in the Key Stage 2 exams; (ix) average
point scores of children in key stage 2 exams; (x) average percent of children absent
on a given day; (xi) percent of children absent from Key Stage 2 exams; (xii) school
type (religious or comprehensive); (xiii) whether a school was involved in the Food for
Life Program; (xiv) Ofsted School Categorization; and (xv) Ofsted Health Categorization
(OfHealth).
The variables listed above were used to make sure that the average school in each
treatment arm was similar in ways that could have influenced whether the treatment
scheme worked: socioeconomic background of the student body; school quality; student
quality; and school type6. Using a random number generator, schools were assigned to
5Since our treatment was assigned at the school level we needed to use the total number of pupils in
years 2 and 5 in our randomization to make sure our sample size was roughly the same across treatment
arms.
6Variables (i), (ii), and (iii) relate to the demographic characteristics of the schools involved. Variables
(iv) and (v) relate to the economic background of the children. Variables (vi) and (vii) relate to the
financial expenditure at the school level. Variables (viii) - (xi) relate to the quality of the student body
at each school. When pupils take their Key Stage 2 exams their performance is marked as achieving level
1-7. For pupils aged 11, they are expected to earn at least a level 4 on their math, science, and English
exams. Variable (xii) denotes if a school has a religious affiliation. Variable (xiii) denotes whether the
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one of the three treatment arms. We then conducted 45 hypothesis tests (control versus
each treatment arm and between the treatment arms) to see if the control sample was
different than either treatment arm or if the treatment arms were different based on the
observable characteristics. If one of the hypothesis tests showed a significant difference at
the 5% level we then re-started the randomization; we ran the randomization six times.
This ensured that, ex ante, at the school level, our sample was balanced by treatment
arm.
Treatments
The two treatments we designed incentivize choice (rather than consumption) of fruit or
vegetables at lunch. We decided to incentivize choice for a few reasons. First, the health
literature highlights how making rewards contingent on consumption of a particular food
can cause children to have a lower preference for that item (see Birch et. al. (1982, 1984)
and Newman and Taylor (1992) for examples). We wanted to minimise the potential for
negative effects on healthy eating. Second, we wanted the experiment to be something
that was relevant to policy, that is low-cost and simple to implement. Rewarding for
choice removes any subjective judgement of the monitor to decide what constitutes an
adequate amount of food consumed to be rewarded. Furthermore, schools can require
children to take a fruit or vegetable at lunch but are unlikely to be able to force them
to eat the item. Therefore the results of our study are likely to be more relevant to
policies that are being considered at the school level now.7 Finally, rewarding for choice
rather than actually consuming an item negates the possibility of cheating. For example,
if rewards were based on consumption, pupils may have an incentive to dispose of the
fruit or vegetable, hide it, give it to a friend or try to mislead monitors regarding actual
consumption. For these reasons, monitoring consumption is more likely to be reliable
when choice is incentivized.
In both schemes, children received a sticker each day if they chose or brought in a fruit
or vegetable at lunchtime.8 Then, at the end of the week (Friday afternoon after lunch),
school voluntarily chose to be part of the Food for Life program (http://www.foodforlife.org.uk) the aim
of which is to enact a whole school food reform by teaching children about healthy eating; it focuses on
the promotion of healthy eating and the value of sustainable food consumption. Variable (xiv) is the
overall classification of the school based on its Office for Standards in Education, Childrens Services and
Skills (Ofsted) results. Ofsted regularly inspects schools and other service providers. Based on these
inspections, schools are given an overall rating: 1 = outstanding; 2 = good; 3 = requires improvement;
and 4 = inadequate. Variable (xv) is one aspect that is included in determining the overall Ofsted rating
(it uses the same scale) and is based on the extent to which the pupils adopt a healthy lifestyle and are
encouraged and enabled to eat and drink healthily.
7Indeed the results of our study are especially relevant to determine if providing (or requiring a pupil
to take) a fruit or vegetable at lunchtime has any follow through effect on consumption behaviour.
8Monitors, who recorded whether children were choosing and consuming fruit and vegetables at lunch
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each pupil had the opportunity to pick a larger prize depending on the incentive scheme in
which the pupil was enrolled. In the individual incentive scheme, if a pupil collected four
stickers in the week, she or he was allowed to choose a prize such as an item of stationery
or a small toy from a reward box.9 If the pupil had three or less stickers, though, the pupil
could not pick a prize and the stickers did not count to earning an award the following
week. In the competition, children were assigned to random groups of four, and only the
pupil with the most stickers in each group was able to select a prize from the reward
box. In the case of a tie, all children with the highest number of stickers in the group
were eligible for a prize. The groups were revealed at the end of the week after lunch so
children would not engage in strategic behaviour, such as making choices based on other
group member’s actions or absenteeism. For example, if a pupil was absent on Monday
then the others in their group would know that pupil could only collect a maximum of
four stickers. The groups were changed each week so the children could not anticipate
with whom they would be competing and, in this treatment as well, unused stickers did
not carry over to the following week.
Timing
Before the interventions began, a background survey was sent to the parents that covered
information on age, gender, ethnicity, primary language, height, weight, and typical di-
etary habits. Then, starting the second week of October, we monitored what children ate
at lunch in all 31 schools. Lunch monitors recorded if a pupil chose a fruit or vegetable or
brought a fruit or vegetable in with a packed lunch. And the monitors recorded whether
the pupil had consumed none, some, or more than half of that fruit or vegetable. On
Friday that week children took a food knowledge test and a “spot-the-difference” test.10
The food knowledge test required pupils to identify seven pictures of different items (e.g.
celery or snickers bar) and mark if each item was healthy or not. The “spot-the-difference”
test was designed to test a pupil’s concentration and required a pupil to compare two sets
of 30 dice that were arranged in a six-by-five square. There were five differences between
the two sets of dice; pupils weres asked to circle those differences. Children had 10 minutes
to complete each test.
The children went on half-term break for one week after the baseline data was collected.
Upon returning to school the children in the treatment schools were informed about the
incentive scheme and children were monitored for the next five weeks. At control schools,
time, were either canteen staff working in the school or parents of children occasionally hired by the
school to help at lunch time. They received a compensation for collecting the information for us.
9See appendix for pictures of some of the rewards from which children were allowed to choose.
10Examples of both can be seen in the appendix.
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the lunch monitors continued to monitor children in the same way they did during the
week in October: they collected data on whether a pupil choose or consumed a fruit or
vegetable. At the competition and individual incentive schools children were incentivized
to choose a fruit or vegetable for a period of four weeks. Each day a pupil chose or brought
in a fruit or vegetable with a packed lunch the pupil received a sticker. Furthermore, as
discussed above, at the end of each week, children would get a large prize based on the
type of incentive scheme in which they were enrolled.
On the fourth Friday of the treatment, the children completed another food knowledge
and “spot-the-difference” test and were reminded that it was the last day of incentives.
The following week, immediately after the treatment, the choices and consumption of
children were still monitored. This allows us to see if there was any effect on choice and
consumption after the incentives were removed. To examine the longer term effects of
the incentives we also went back to schools six months later, in June, and monitored the
choice and consumption of the same children.
4. Conceptual Framework, Hypotheses & Estimation Approach
In this section we set out our hypotheses and our empirical strategy.
4.1 Hypotheses
We designed our field experiment to test the three hypotheses laid out below, to examine
whether there were heterogeneous effects of incentives, and to compare the two incentive
schemes.
Hypothesis 1: Children will choose more fruit or vegetables when they are rewarded for
taking a fruit or vegetable at lunchtime.
By providing a reward for choosing a healthy option, the benefit of taking a fruit or
vegetable at lunchtime will have increased for each pupil. Therefore we would expect
that, while the incentive scheme is running, children are more likely to choose a fruit or
vegetable. This would be consistent with the work by Gneezy and Charness (2009), Just
and Price (2013), Loewenstein et al. (2016), and List and Samek (2014). Furthermore,
the effect is likely to differ by subgroups. Since boys, younger children, and children from
poorer socioeconomic backgrounds have been shown to be more impatient (see Delany and
Doyle (2012) and Bettinger and Slonim (2007)) then they may respond more positively
to the immediate reward. The literature has also shown that there are gender differences
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in responses to information only campaigns (see Muller et al. (2005), Perry et al. (1998)
and Kelder et al. (1995)). The health literature highlights age effects with regards to
food preferences and tastes (see Birch (1999) and the references therein); suggesting that
there is likely to be differences in the effect of the incentive by age as well.
Hypothesis 2: Children will consume more fruit or vegetables when they are rewarded
for taking a fruit or vegetable at lunchtime.
The behavioural literature has shown that the default option can affect choices made
by individuals (see Keller et. al. (2011), Choi et. al. (2003), and Johnson and Goldstein
(2003) for examples) and even help reduce calorie consumption (Wisdom et. al. (2010)).
As a result, health initiatives at schools have started to require children to have a fruit
or vegetable on their plate.11 By incentivizing children to take a fruit or vegetable our
experiment is likely to have a follow-through effect on consumption. Furthermore, unlike
previous studies, our children have no incentive to lie or cheat regarding the amount of
the fruit or vegetables they consumed; the rewards are only based on choice. As with
choice, there is reason to expect that the effect on consumption will vary with gender,
age, and socioeconomic background.
Hypothesis 3: Children will choose and consume more fruit or vegetables after the in-
centive is removed than before.
Given how food preferences develop, if children have been eating more fruit or vegetables
during the intervention period they may have developed a preference for fruit or vegeta-
bles or developed a habit of eating fruit or vegetables at lunch time. There is indeed
evidence that food preferences and eating habits form in childhood and track into adult-
hood.12 Becker and Murphy (1988) and Becker (1992) develop a model of habit formation
where the marginal utility of today’s consumption is correlated with historical consump-
tion. Therefore a small change in today’s behaviour – caused by an exogenous increase
in the benefit of consuming a fruit or vegetable for instance – could lead to long term
changes in consumption. More recently, theory on present-bias (hyperbolic) preferences
such as that in Laibson (1997) and O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999) suggest that provid-
ing incentives to overcome the costs of switching to healthy behaviour (see Charness and
11See Dillon and Lane (1989) for an evaluation of the differences between offering and serving a fruit
or vegetable and Just and Price (2013a) for the effect of requiring schools to serve fruit and vegetables.
12See Kelder et. al. (1994), Resnicow et. al. (1998), and Singer et. al. (1995) for discussions.
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Gneezy (2009) and Acland and Levy (2013)) could be effective. Of course, if the extrinsic
incentive replaced the intrinsic motivation that children had to eat healthily before the
intervention, then after the prizes are removed we may see a decrease in the amount of
fruit and vegetables chosen and consumed. Therefore, to see if there is a lasting effect
(positive or negative) of the two schemes we examine choice and consumption of fruit and
vegetables in the week immediately following the intervention and six months later.
4.2 Estimation Approach
To test our hypotheses we estimate the following:
yit = α + β1Weeks 2-5t + β2(Competitioni ×Weeks 2-5t) + β3(Individuali ×Weeks 2-5t)
+ β4Week 6t + β5(Competitioni ×Week 6t) + β6(Individuali ×Week 6t)
+ ci + εit
where yit equals 1 if pupil i chose a fruit or vegetable on day t and 0 otherwise.
Weeks 2-5t is a dummy variable that equals 1 during weeks 2 to 5 (this is when the
incentives were in place) and 0 otherwise. Week 6t equals 1 for each day during week
6, the period immediately after the incentives were removed, and 0 otherwise. We use
two indicators to capture the effect of being in a school that was treated: Competitioni
equals 1 if pupil i is in a school that was assigned to the competitive treatment and
0 otherwise; and Individuali equals 1 if pupil i is in a school that was assigned to the
individual incentive treatment. Therefore, parameters β2 and β3 capture the effect of the
incentives when they were in place. The parameters β5 and β6 capture the effect of the
treatments in the week immediately after the incentives were removed. Finally, ci is an
individual pupil fixed effect and εit is an error term.
Our primary estimation method is therefore a linear probability model (LPM)13 with
pupil fixed effects (FE). This allows us to examine within-subject treatment effects and
the comparison to the control group allows us to control for any day and week effects that
might be present over the course of our field experiment.
The dependent variable in our regressions is bounded upwards (at 1); children who
chose and consumed a fruit or vegetable every day at baseline have an outcome variable
equal to one and no improvement is possible for this group. Therefore, we estimate the
13An alternative approach would be to estimate a fixed effects logit or probit. However, given that
our main estimation of interest is an interaction term and that there are problems with estimating the
marginal effects for interaction terms in the probit and logit models (Ai and Norton (2003)) we use the
LPM. Furthermore, the positive aspects of this approach as highlighted in Angrist and Piske (2009) (page
105-107).
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LPM with pupil FE on the whole sample and on the sample of children who are not
bounded upwards in their response, i.e. those who did not have a mean outcome equal
to one in the baseline (referred to later as “Less than 100%” group). We are particularly
interested in the latter group because those who are not choosing or consuming a fruit or
vegetable every day is the subgroup that could most benefit from the intervention – they
could be encouraged to make healthier choices.
5. Results
5.1 Summary Statistics
We first compare our treatment and control schools in the baseline period. Table 1 Panel
A presents the means of the outcome variables and other covariates by control and both
treatment groups. The final three columns show the p-values for differences between the
treatments and control and between the two treatments. The p-values were calculated,
to account for intra-school correlation, by regressing each baseline variable on one of the
treatment indicators, and clustering the standard errors at the school level. We have 31
schools in our sample but, when looking at sub-samples, our analysis may contain less
than 30 schools. Therefore, the standard clustering methods are not appropriate. To deal
with this we correct for the potential clustering problems using the Cameron, Gelbach,
and Miller (2008) wild bootstrap method with 1000 replications. The p-values shown in
Table 1 are based on this cluster correction method, though, in this case, the standard
clustering method gives nearly identical results.
Table 1 Panel A shows that, for the whole sample, there are no statistically signifi-
cant differences between the control group and either treatment group. We do have one
significant difference when we compare the two treatments but that is far less than the
seven at the 10% level we would randomly expect from conducting the 69 tests in this
panel. This suggests that, based on observables, the randomization worked as expected.
Furthermore, even though they are insignificant, the size of the differences (in most cases)
is less than one standard deviation, suggesting that the control and treatment groups are
close to being observationally equivalent at baseline.
Table 1 Panel B shows the summary statistics for the sample of pupils who, in the
baseline week, chose a fruit or vegetable less than 100% of the time. This group is of
interest because they are the ones who have some margin to increase their consumption
of fruit and vegetables due to the treatment, as opposed to those who already chose a fruit
or vegetable every day. Of the 69 tests presented in this panel we only find four significant
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differences at the 10% level; again, this is far below the seven significant differences one
would expect to occur randomly. Furthermore, as with the whole sample, the size of
the differences are generally less than one standard deviation suggesting that, again, the
control and treatment groups are close to being observationally equivalent at baseline.
5.2 Descriptive Figures
We will examine the effects of the incentive schemes on both choice and consumption.
The “choice” variable is a dummy equal to one if a pupil chose a fruit or vegetable on a
given day. Our measure consumption is a dummy variable equal to one if the pupil eats
at least some of a fruit or vegetable on that day (we will refer to this variable as “try”).14
Since the incentive was based on the total amount of healthy choices made in a week, we
provide a descriptive overview of the weekly mean outcomes for choice and consumption
in Figures 1 and 2.
Figure 1 shows the effect of our treatments on choosing a fruit or vegetable. Panel (a)
shows the full sample. During the baseline, pupils in control and treatment schools were
choosing a fruit or vegetable with their lunch, roughly, 83% of the time. In the individual
incentive scheme, to earn a small prize at the end of the week a pupil would have to choose
a fruit or vegetable four times, 80% of the time. Therefore, on average, pupils already
qualified for a prize in the individual incentive scheme. However, with the introduction of
the incentives in week one, pupils in both treatments began to choose significantly more
fruit and vegetables. Over time, though, the likelihood of choosing a fruit or vegetable
increases among the control group, and catches up with the treatment groups. In panel
(b) of Figure 1 we see the effect of the treatment on pupils who did not choose fruit and
vegetables 100% of the time in baseline, those with room to improve their behaviour.
At baseline there is no difference in behaviour for pupils between the treatments or the
control. In week one pupils who received an incentive choose fruit and vegetables more
but the control group catches up quicker in this sample. Overall, this figure shows that
pupils are more likely to choose a fruit or vegetable after returning from the mid-term
break (denoted by the vertical line), and that this increase occurs faster for pupils in the
treatment groups.
Figure 2 shows the effect of the treatments on trying a fruit or vegetable. In panel (a)
we again see the full sample. At baseline there are no significant differences between the
14We also examined the intensity of consumption by looking at whether pupils ate more than half their
fruit or vegetable. The results are broadly similar to our findings with ‘try’ and there is the possibility of
subjectivity due to lunch monitors judging what is more than half. Therefore, we include those results
in the appendix for the interested reader.
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treatments and the control (refer to Table 1). The control group is much slower to increase
their consumption of fruit or vegetables upon returning to school in comparison to choice;
they only show a small increase in week three that seems to persist into week four and
the week after the treatment. However, the treatments have an immediate and significant
effect: pupils increase their consumption of fruit and vegetables by roughly 12% in week 1
compared to the baseline. After two weeks, though, the effect of the individual incentive
appears to dissipate while the effect of the competition stays constant. Panel (b) shows
the effects for the sample that did not choose fruit and vegetables 100% of the time in
the baseline. Here we see roughly the same results as we did when looking at choice. The
interventions increase consumption immediately but the control group catches up quicker
than in the overall sample. Here, though, competition may be working better and still
having an effect in the last two weeks of the experiment. Figure 2 panel (b) shows the
share of pupils consuming fruit and vegetables in the individual and competitive schemes
is similar at the start: around 70% in week 1 and 75% in week 2. In week 3 and 4, though,
a gap emerges: the share in the individual scheme drops to around 68% while it stays
around 75% in the competitive scheme. Overall, this figure shows that pupils are much
less likely to increase their consumption of fruit and vegetables when returning from a
mid-term break and that at least the competitive incentive scheme can have a positive
and consistent effect in increasing consumption of fruit and vegetables.
The rise in the control group after the mid-term break is notable. One explanation is
that monitoring alone can cause an increase in fruit and vegetable consumption. How-
ever we cannot, with certainty, attribute the trend observed in the control group to the
monitoring itself, since we do not know what would have happened independently of mon-
itoring. One would need data where students are unaware they are monitored, which we
do not have and would likely be difficult to obtain. The trend is important as it suggests
that other factors (besides our incentive schemes) are also having large impacts on con-
sumption of fruit and vegetables. These other factors could be the monitoring itself, but
could also be due to seasonal variations, and holiday interruptions.
5.3 Short and Medium Term Effects
We now turn to the average treatment effects for the main outcome variables of interest.
Average treatment effects on choice
We start with the results on the whole sample in Table 2, including children who were
already at the upper bound in week 1. In all of our tables we report both the standard
errors clustered at the school level using standard methods and the p-value from the
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wild bootstrap, as discussed previously, following Cameron, Gelbach, and Miller (2008).
We find little effects of either incentive scheme on choice overall (Column [1]). The
point estimates for competition and the individual incentive are positive but small and
imprecisely estimated. When we break the sample up by gender and whether a pupil
qualified for a free school meal (FSM)15 we also find no significant effects: columns [2]
and [3] split the sample by gender; columns [4] and [5] by FSM. However, when we look
at the results by age in columns [6] and [7] we find significant results. Column [6] shows
that younger children, those in year two, respond negatively to the individual incentive.
During the baseline, children in year two were choosing a fruit or vegetable 85.2% of the
time therefore the point estimate of -0.066 implies an 8% decrease in the probability of
choosing a fruit or vegetable. Furthermore, in the week immediately after the incentive is
taken away, younger pupils continue to choose less fruit and vegetables. This significantly
negative effect does not show up in the overall effect because the older pupils, those in
year five, respond positively to the individual incentive: they choose fruit and vegetables
16% more often than they did in baseline.
Table 2A, presented in Appendix B, shows whether the estimates of the effects in
Table 2 are significantly different by gender, FSM status, and age. As would be expected,
when we examine if the estimates for the individual incentives in column [6] are equal
to those in column [7] we find that they are significantly different; older pupils respond
more positively to the individual incentive than younger pupils. The comparisons by
gender and FSM status, though, show no significant difference. Therefore, Tables 2 and
2A show us that the overall average treatment effect of the individual incentive on choice
is masking a significant heterogeneous effect by age.
We also examine if there are differential responses to the treatment type. At the bot-
tom of Table 2 we present the p-values for whether the estimated effect from competition
equals that of the individual incentive. We find that for two groups – poorer pupils and
younger pupils – the competitive incentive works better: pupils who qualify for FSM
and those in Year 2 choose more fruit and vegetables in the competitive setting than in
the individual setting. These results carry over to the medium term as well. This sug-
gests competition may be more effective at getting younger and poorer pupils to choose
healthier items than an individual based incentive scheme.
In Table 3 we consider the restricted sample – those who did not choose a fruit or
vegetable every day during the baseline and, thus, have room to improve their nutritional
15Pupils from disadvantaged households qualify for free school meals. Therefore, to examine the effect
of the treatment on children from more disadvantaged backgrounds, we break the sample into pupils who
qualify for FSM and those that do not.
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habits. Restricting the sample in this way reduces the sample to 215 pupils. Column [1]
shows that the competition increased the probability of choosing a fruit or vegetable by
17.5 percentage points and we find evidence that the effect was sustained to some extent
in week 6, immediately after the incentive is removed, although the size of the effect is
halved to 9.6 percentage points. This means that the competition, roughly, led to pupils
choosing one more fruit or vegetable per week during the intervention and one more fruit
or vegetable every two weeks even after the intervention finished. The results for the
individual incentive are positive but not significant in the short term.
We next turn to examine the various subgroups. For each of these groups we have a
reduced sample size. Of the 215 pupils we have 102 boys and 113 girls, 93 pupils are in
year 2 and 122 are in year 5. We have 29 pupils who are eligible for free school meals
and 179 who are not eligible, there are 7 whom we do not have information on their free
school meal eligibility. We find that competition significantly increased the likelihood
of consuming fruit or vegetables for nearly everyone (the point estimate for females is
large but not significant). However, the effect of the individual incentive is mixed; there
is evidence boys responded positively to the incentive but we again find that younger
children responded negatively and older children responded positively. Therefore, we
observe the same pattern for choice with this sample as we did with the whole sample:
there is a stark heterogeneous effect of the individual incentive by age. However, the
negative effect on younger children carries over into the medium term. The significance
of the heterogeneous effect by age is shown in Table 3A (see Appendix B).
When we compare the two treatments, looking at the results at the bottom of Table
3, we find that girls and younger pupils responded significantly more positively to the
competition than then the individual incentive. These results suggest that competition is
working well on incentivizing pupils who have room to increase their choice of healthier
items at lunchtime. While, even for pupils with worse diets, the individual incentive is
causing some groups to choose fruit or vegetables less often. Furthermore, the positive
effect of competition seems to have a lasting effect at least into the medium term by
causing males and younger pupils (two key groups) along with non-FSM pupils to choose
healthier items even after the incentive has been removed.
Average treatment effects on trying
We now examine our consumption variable that we call “trying” which equals one if a
child ate at least part of a portion of the fruit or vegetable at lunchtime.16 We do not
16We also monitored whether the children at more than half the portion they were served. We report
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condition the consumption variable or the regressions on whether a pupil chooses a fruit
or vegetable. Therefore the estimates in the tables below show the causal effect of the
incentives on the probability that any given pupil tries a fruit or vegetable in the short
and medium term.
Table 4 shows the effects on the overall sample, including those at the upper bound at
baseline. Focusing first on the short term effects, we find that the competitive incentive
scheme increases trying by 11.2 percentage points during the intervention (Column [1]).
We find no evidence of positive effects for the individual incentive scheme. Splitting
by gender and FSM status (columns [2]-[5]) gives a similar picture as the one observed
with choice: we find positive significant effects for the competitive scheme for all groups
except, somewhat notably, boys; and we do not find significant effects for the individual
incentive scheme. Similarly, when breaking the sample by age, we find positive effects
of the competitive scheme on both subgroups, albeit somewhat imprecisely estimated.
However, for the individual incentive, there are stark differences in the response by age.
Table 4A (Appendix B) shows that the differences we find by age are significant for the
individual incentive. We estimate an increase of around 20 percentage points for the
Year 5 children and a decrease of about 7 percentage points for the Year 2 children.
These results provide evidence for Hypothesis 2, but the hypothesis is strongly rejected
for young children. We find little evidence of persistence in week 6, except for girls
and Year 2 children in the competition treatment as well as for Year 2 children in the
individual incentive treatment (the latter being an adverse effect). There is evidence that
the competitive incentive led to a significantly more positive response, both during the
period when the incentive was in place and the week after it was removed, among females,
FSM pupils, and the younger children.
Table 5 shows the effects on trying when we restrict the sample (excluding those
bounded upwards in terms of choice behavior17). The results are much larger but similar
in nature to the results reported in Table 4. We find an overall significant increase of
21 percentage points due to the competition intervention and no significant effects of
the individual incentive in the overall sample. Again, the imprecisely estimated positive
effect of the individual incentive masks strong differences in response between younger and
older children, with younger children responding negatively and older children responding
positively. These differential effects by age are significant as seen in Table 5A. While the
these in Tables B3 and B4, the results are very similar to what we report for trying.
17We restrict the sample based on choice rather than trying in order to keep the samples consistent.
We have estimated the effects on trying for the group who tried fruits and vegetables less than 100%
in the baseline week and the results are qualitatively similar. These are available from the authors on
request.
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differences by age for competition are not significantly different.
We find stronger evidence of persistence once the incentive is removed, at least for the
competitive incentive. Except for girls and Year 5 children, all effects are positive and
significant. They are also quite large in magnitude: overall, the probability of trying a
fruit or vegetable at lunch has increased by 14 percentage points in week 6 for children
in the competition treatment. In contrast, the only persistent effect we find with the
individual incentive is the adverse negative effect on Year 2 children. Comparing the two
treatments we again find that female and younger pupils respond more to the competitive
incentive scheme, both during the incentive period and once it had been taken away. This
means that the competitive scheme, on average, caused children to choose and try more
than one additional fruit or vegetable per week both during and after the treatment.
These results provide stark evidence regarding the three hypotheses by incentive
scheme. There is little evidence that the individual incentive increases choice and con-
sumption of fruit and vegetables (Hypotheses 1 and 2). The only significant evidence with
regards to the individual incentive regarding Hypothesis 3 (the effect after the incentive
is removed) is that the individual incentive appears to have a lasting negative effect on
younger children. Indeed, the overall imprecise positive effect of the individual incentive
masks the differential effect that the individual incentive has by age. However, there is
strong positive evidence that the competitive incentive encourages all subgroups to choose
and consume more fruit and vegetables (Hypotheses 1 and 2) and that, for most groups,
those effects persist even when the incentive is removed (Hypothesis 3). Furthermore boys
and FSM pupils do respond positively to the competitive scheme (unlike under other in-
terventions) while girls, FSM pupils, and Year 2 pupils also generally respond better to
the competitive scheme than the individual incentive.
Cost Effectiveness
To understand the implication of these results and what they mean for policy makers
we want to look at the costs of getting a pupil to try an additional fruit or vegetable
under each scheme. Since our most robust results are from the intervention period and
the week immediately following, we focus on the shorter term effectiveness. Furthermore
we compare the results to a commonly used intervention to understand how each scheme
compares to currently implemented programs.
At most, each pupil could win one prize and earn five stickers per week. The prizes
were all under £1 (some were only £0.30) and the stickers were no more than £0.04 each.
That means we spent, at most, £4.20 per pupil over the course of the intervention. Since
we let all pupils participate in the experiment we will look at the effects on the overall
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population (we could look at cost effectiveness for only our group of interest, i.e. those
from the less that 100% group, but it would likely be costly to identify them and we do
not know if our results hold for a targeted intervention).
When looking at the individual incentive we find that, during the intervention, pupils
increased the likelihood of trying a fruit or vegetable by 3.3 percentage points, though,
this was imprecisely measured, and there were no medium term effects. That means that,
over the first five weeks of our experiment (including medium term), pupils ate 0.7 more
fruit and vegetables because of the intervention or, that it cost, roughly, £6 to get a pupil
to eat an additional fruit or vegetable.
The competition scheme was more effective than the individual scheme; it increased
the likelihood that, for the overall sample, the probability of trying a fruit or vegetable
increased by 11 percentage points during the intervention and by 6.7 percentage points
immediately after the incentive was removed. Thus, for the first five weeks of our experi-
ment pupils ate 2.5 additional fruit or vegetables. That means it cost £1.68, at most, to
get a pupil to eat an additional fruit or vegetable under the competitive scheme.
Are these costs large or small? To determine this we compare the results to the
“Food Dudes” intervention that has been implemented in many countries (e.g. the UK,
Ireland, Italy, and the USA). There have been many experimental studies done showing
the effectiveness of the program but we will focus on the Horne et al. (2009) study from
Ireland because Ireland is one of the few countries to have released cost data. In Ireland
the Food Dudes program had two main parts: (1) during an intervention period of four
weeks schools provided fruits and vegetables18 and showed six minute videos19 of ‘Food
Dudes’ eating and extolling the virtues of fruit and vegetables to save the world from
the ‘Junk Punks;’ (2) prizes and ‘Food Dude’ lunchboxes were provided for bringing in
and eating fruits and vegetables. The prizes were given out throughout the school year.
According to the Irish government20 implementing the program for 60,000 children would
cost e658,000 for the prizes and e503,550 for the fruit and vegetables or, roughly, e20
per pupil.
Horne et al. (2009) find that during the intervention period (when food was being
provided) pupils consumed, roughly 22 grams more of fruit and vegetables per week.
Using the NHS living well proportion of 40g as a measure, this means that, over the nine
month school year, pupils would have consumed nearly 9.7 more fruit and vegetables or
18In Ireland, generally, there is no provision of food by schools. Pupils are expected to bring in a packed
lunch.
19See http://www.fooddudes.co.uk for examples of the videos.
20See “Strategy for School Fruit Scheme” submitted by Ireland for the 2012/2013 school year.
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that it costs at least £1.9 per additional fruit or vegetable consumed. This is a lower
bound as these costs do not include licensing, organizational costs, etc. Indeed the Irish
government puts the cost of the whole program for 60,000 pupils at over e2 million; nearly
double the costs we are considering when looking at just the food and prizes. Therefore
the upper bound on costs is £3.8 per additional fruit or vegetable consumed.
What does this comparison tell us? It shows that our competitive scheme has the
potential to be as cost effective as a multifaceted individual incentive scheme that had to
be augmented by videos, food provision, and teachers taking time to discuss the goals of
the program.21
5.4 Choice and Consumption Dynamics
Having established that there are differences in the effectiveness of the incentive schemes
we now move on to explain why the competitive scheme appears to work better in compar-
ison to individual incentive scheme. In this section we will analyze the dynamics of choice
and consumption throughout the week and as such we exclude the post incentive period.
In particular, we will look at if there are different dynamics during the intervention based
on the two types of treatments and examine what those differences may suggest.
In the individual scheme, the threshold to obtain the weekly prize was known and
fixed. Given the exogenous pre-determined goal a pupil had to reach there was room for
discouragement to take place; if a pupil had not eaten a fruit or vegetable on Monday
and Tuesday then there was zero probability the pupil would get a prize that week.
Besides having no external incentive from Wednesday onwards, a pupil might also feel
discouraged and choose not to select a healthy option. Therefore, to examine if there is a
discouragement effect we break the sample into two groups. Table 6 column [1] contains
children who had ‘missed’ the prize as of Wednesday, i.e. they had not chosen a fruit or
vegetable on Monday and Tuesday. Column [2] contains those children who had chosen at
least one fruit or vegetable before Wednesday. The effect of individual incentive is large
and significant for those who still have a chance of getting a prize, i.e. those in column
[2]. However, for those who have missed the chance of getting a prize the effect of the
individual incentive is estimated to be negative, though, it is insignificant. Therefore, the
effect of the incentive wears off for those who miss the goal in the individual incentive
scheme.
In the competitive scheme children did not know how many fruit or vegetables they
21While our ‘trying’ variable does not equate to the actual eating of fruits and vegetables as examined
by Horne et. al. (2009) our results on whether they eat “more than half” are more comparable. Those
results predict the same cost effectiveness as looking at ‘trying’ (refer to tables B3 and B4 in the appendix).
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would have to choose to get a prize at the end of the week; if they chose five fruit or
vegetables, though, they were guaranteed a prize. Since children did not know who was
in their group and some children did not choose a fruit or vegetable every day, a pupil
could assign a subjective probability to winning given how many items she had chosen
during the week.22 Therefore, the choices made on Wednesday, Thursday, and Friday
depend on each students subjective probability and may not differ by the consumption
patterns earlier in the week. Indeed, this is what we see, the point estimates in columns
[1] and [2] are not significantly different for the competitive treatment23. They are also
not significantly different from the overall effect for the less than 100% group shown for
the competitive treatment in Table 3, though, we cannot determine if the effect in Table
6 is different than zero24.
These results speak to the intrinsic incentive differences between the two treatments.
The external, known goal in the individual scheme can lead to a lack of incentive because
of previous choice patterns. In contrast, the probability of winning the prize in the
competitive treatment depends on the subjective probability that the student holds, which
is presumably always positive.
The effect of the competitive scheme on consuming at least part of a fruit or vegetable
is similar to what we found for choice. Columns [3] and [4] show again a large positive effect
of competition that is relatively independent of previous consumption patterns during the
week (the point estimate for competition is not significantly different between columns [3]
and [4])25. The individual incentive only has a significant effect for children who have not
missed the chance to win a prize; the estimate in column [4] for the individual incentive
is significantly different from that in column [3]. There is room for discouragement in the
individual incentive scheme.
Summarizing, we find that each incentive scheme is associated with different dynamics
of choice and consumption behavior. In particular, the incentive in the individual scheme
disappears by the end of the week for some students. Thus the overall differences in choice
and consumption could be due to the way the goals are defined, with, in particular, the
known constant goal of the individual incentive causing discouragement.
22In fact there was an increasing probability of winning the prize based on the number of fruit and
vegetables one chose. There was a small probability (under 5%) chance of winning if a pupil had chosen
zero or one item, a 6.7% chance of winning if a pupil chose two items, a 21% chance of winning if a pupil
chose three items, and a 39% chance of winning if a pupil chose 4 items.
23However, we can reject that the point estimates in columns [1] and [2] are the same for the individual
incentive scheme.
24This could be due to the significant decrease in the sample size caused by the sample restrictions on
the dynamic analysis.
25However, again, it is also not significantly different than the overall estimate for trying in Table 5.
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5.5 Long term effects
To evaluate whether the effects we find lead to permanent changes in habits, we con-
tacted the schools again 6 months later and asked them to conduct an additional week of
monitoring; 21 out of the 31 schools agreed.26
To capture the long run effect, we now include two additional interaction terms in
our main regressions. These are the two treatment indicators with a dummy variable
denoting 6 months later. Table 7 and 8 present the results for choice and try respectively.
To conserve space we only present the additional interaction terms. For both the overall
sample and the restricted and for both choice and consumption we do not find evidence
of any long run effect; when looking at the significance using the appropriate bootstrap
method, no results are significant. We examine the same subgroups as we did in section
5.3 and none of the coefficients are precisely estimated. Therefore, there is no evidence
for hypothesis 3 with regards to the longer term.
5.6 Food Knowledge and Other Outcomes
One question is whether the intervention triggered a response only through the incentives,
or also through learning. It could be that the intervention taught children that fruit
and vegetables are healthy and that they respond to that information rather than the
incentives. We are able to test for this possibility by comparing the results on a knowledge
test that was conducted just before and at the end of the intervention. The test shows
pictures of seven food items, including three or four fruit or vegetables and unhealthy
items (such as sweets, chips, ice cream, crisps, and fish fingers). On the test children were
asked to identify what the item was and whether the item was healthy or not (see Figure
A2 for an example). On average, we find that children described 92% items correctly as
healthy or not and were able to identify 83% of the items correctly before the intervention.
We estimate a simple linear model with the change in the test score of identifying
items correctly as the dependent variable and include indicators for the two treatment
groups. The results are presented in Table 9 for the whole sample and in Table 10 for
the sample of children who chose less than 100% in the first week. The effects across
groups are not consistent and we fail to find evidence that the scores improved more in
26To be sure that the sample used for the long term analysis is not a positively selected sample (of
schools that have had a positive experience with the incentive schemes in particular) we ran the previous
analysis on the subset of 21 schools to check the selection. The results are very similar in nature to the
ones found with the whole sample (Tables 2 – 5), so we are confident that the long-term results are not
driven by selection. We also recreated the descriptive table, Table 1, and found similar results, i.e. no
significant differences between treatments and control or the treatments. The results are not reported
here but are available upon request.
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the treated schools. If anything, we find negative effects for the children in the individual
incentive group (restricted sample). We only find a positive significant effect, see Table 10
column 7, for the Year 5 children in the competition treatment. Based on these results,
we can safely say there is no evidence that the responses to the intervention are driven
by learning.
An additional exercise we propose is to check whether the interventions affected other
relevant outcomes that could partially explain the treatment effects we found27. These
results are reported in Appendix B.
A first outcome of interest is attendance. One concern could be that the prospect of
receiving (or not) a reward may affect attendance rates. We investigate this possibility in
Tables B5 and B6. Table B5 reports results for the whole sample, while Table B6 reports
results for the less than 100% sample. We do not find any significant effect on attendance
overall or by subgroup. We do find positive and significant effects on attendance for males
in the individual incentive scheme for the restricted sample. However, in the main results
we do not find positive and significant effects of the individual incentive for boys when
looking at either choice or try. Thus, these effects appear to be difficult to reconcile with
the treatment effects we found. We conclude that changes in attendance rates are unlikely
to drive the treatment effects on choice and consumption.
A second outcome that seems worth considering is whether children are more or less
likely to bring a packed lunch as a result of the intervention. This would not be a
confounding factor though. But it would provide some information regarding how children
adjusted to the introduction of the incentive schemes. For example, pupils may have put
pressure on their parents to provide a packed lunch if they do not like the fruit or vegetables
on offer at school. Table B7 and B8 report the results. We find no evidence that children
were more or less likely to bring a packed lunch overall. In the restricted sample, we find
a positive and significant effect for males in the competitive scheme for week 6 but not
while the intervention is actually taking place. This means that the treatment effects we
find are driven by children changing their behaviour within the meal context they started
with (packed lunch or school meal).
6. Conclusion
This paper provides field evidence on how two incentive schemes change how children
choose and consume fruit and vegetables at lunchtime. We conducted a large scale field
27We do not directly measure behavioral problems, or classroom disruptions. We did however run
a questionnaire through head teachers after the intervention asking for feedback. We do not have any
evidence (even anecdotal) that the incentive schemes affected pupils behaviour in the classroom.
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experiment in 31 primary schools in England testing for the effects of two different incen-
tive schemes: a competition and an individual incentive scheme. Both schemes lasted 4
weeks and we monitored choice and consumption of fruit and vegetables by children made
over that period, as well as one week before, one week after and 6 months later.
We find two main results. First, competitive and individual incentives have different
effects and one cannot draw a unique conclusion on whether incentives can positively
influence the likelihood that a student will eat healthily. The competitive incentive is
overall more effective and more robust. Children respond positively to the competition
and increase their choice and consumption of fruit and vegetables. However, the individual
incentive, in contrast, has very heterogeneous effects. Older children respond positively,
while younger children are affected negatively. Second, when there were significant effects
during the intervention period, we tend find that those effects carry over into the week
after the incentives are removed. However, we find no evidence of behaviour change six
months later; the effects of the temporary incentive appear to be short lived.
When looking at our individual incentive scheme we find smaller effects than those
found in Just and Price (2013) and Loewenstein et al. (2016). Even though their inter-
vention is similar in nature, there are important differences in the design that are worth
mentioning. We reward choice instead of consumption, we reward students each day based
on one day’s consumption with a reward of smaller value (a sticker) compared to their
daily reward. Furthermore, while they stick to rewards based on each day’s consump-
tion only, we reward subjects with a relatively larger valued prize at the end of the week
based on choices throughout the week (which has the potential to cause discouragement
as discussed in the section 5.4).
The subject pools are also different between our paper and both studies. The baseline
consumption rate of fruit and vegetables was 33.2% in Just and Price (2013) and 39%
in Loewenstein et al. (2016) while for our overall sample it is 76% and for our less than
100% sample it is still 46%. Therefore the differences in our results could highlight a
non-linear effect of incentives based on the initial level of healthy eating. Or, since we
have less people who can respond positively to the intervention, the upper bound of any
effect we could estimate is likely lower. Despite the design and sample differences, though,
we do come to qualitatively similar results regarding the short term effects of individual
incentives. However, we do not find evidence of habit formation as in Loewenstein et al.
(2016), despite having an intervention of similar length.
Overall our results show the need to study various forms of incentive schemes as it is not
clear that incentives will work in the same way for different subgroups of the population.
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It is even possible that some incentives lead some groups to become discouraged. In
terms of policy implications, our findings suggest that the competitive incentive is more
effective overall, while the individual incentive can have adverse effects on some subgroups
of children. But we also advocate for more research, particularly using field experiments,
to investigate in more detail how incentive schemes work and for whom.
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Figure 1: Proportion of pupils choosing a fruit or vegetable
a) Full Sample
b) Sample with less than 100% Choice in Baseline
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Figure 2: Proportion of pupils trying a fruit or vegetable
a) Full Sample
b) Sample with less than 100% Choice in Baseline
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Table 1: Summary Statistics Control and Treatment Groups
Control N Treatment: N Treatment: N C vs T1 C vs T2 T1 vs T2
Individual Competition p-value p-value p-value
(C) (T1) (T2)
Panel A: All Pupils
Choice 0.841 1018 0.847 765 0.821 1014 0.925 0.769 0.713
Try 0.739 1056 0.769 644 0.72 1039 0.721 0.815 0.599
Eat more than half 0.554 1056 0.618 644 0.614 1039 0.352 0.571 0.985
Female 0.513 1018 0.438 765 0.558 1014 0.188 0.414 0.040
1st Language English 0.977 1018 0.983 746 0.931 983 0.945 0.244 0.152
White British 0.905 1014 0.926 747 0.805 982 0.771 0.322 0.254
Year 2 0.500 1018 0.537 765 0.619 1014 0.835 0.286 0.647
Free School Meal % 0.206 1009 0.197 736 0.154 982 0.901 0.406 0.515
School Dinner % 0.52 998 0.453 677 0.479 961 0.539 0.699 0.795
Packed Lunch % 0.479 998 0.547 677 0.521 961 0.531 0.671 0.795
Special dietary 0.053 1014 0.097 744 0.128 972 0.162 0.132 0.699
requirements %
Specific health cond. % 0.144 1004 0.167 742 0.161 951 0.561 0.585 0.887
Ofsted overall score 2.066 1018 1.875 765 2.206 1014 0.418 0.569 0.244
Ofsted Health Score 1.396 1018 1.536 765 1.424 1014 0.633 0.971 0.667
Per pupil Expenditure 4097 1018 4126 765 3816 1014 0.941 0.370 0.280
Catering costs 112.1 1018 94.1 765 62.6 1014 0.573 0.236 0.336
Food for Life 0.21 1018 0.40 765 0.17 1014 0.364 0.815 0.292
Headcount girls 106 1018 122 765 123 1014 0.667 0.362 0.979
Headcount boys 114 1018 138 765 131 1014 0.625 0.358 0.875
Average point score 0.288 861 0.28 670 0.283 874 0.144 0.272 0.731
% Level 4 or > 0.815 861 0.789 670 0.751 874 0.607 0.200 0.571
in Eng/Maths
Persistent Absence 0.024 907 0.017 726 0.021 874 0.671 0.831 0.693
Absence 0.054 907 0.051 726 0.054 874 0.569 0.959 0.677
Panel B: Restricted sample (Chose less than 100% Choice in baseline week)
Choice 0.545 356 0.515 241 0.477 346 0.735 0.464 0.639
Try 0.455 343 0.458 225 0.375 365 0.977 0.388 0.300
Eat more than half 0.329 343 0.356 225 0.323 365 0.715 0.929 0.675
Female 0.396 356 0.419 241 0.575 346 0.769 0.064 0.084
1st Language English 0.961 356 0.965 231 0.946 333 0.889 0.777 0.659
White British 0.854 356 0.944 231 0.784 333 0.262 0.617 0.202
Year 2 0.382 356 0.303 241 0.624 346 0.771 0.048 0.348
Free School Meal % 0.154 351 0.102 226 0.162 333 0.635 0.947 0.533
School Dinner % 0.441 349 0.371 240 0.558 321 0.729 0.452 0.302
Packed Lunch % 0.556 349 0.629 240 0.442 321 0.723 0.456 0.302
Special dietary 0.028 356 0.108 231 0.177 328 0.104 0.072 0.350
requirements %
Specific health cond. % 0.179 351 0.228 228 0.128 328 0.625 0.482 0.236
Ofsted overall score 2.169 356 2.079 241 2.263 346 0.613 0.759 0.422
Ofsted Health Score 1.346 356 1.485 241 1.468 346 0.815 0.749 0.965
Per pupil Expenditure 3727 356 3919 241 3743 346 0.282 1.009 0.521
Catering costs 84.2 356 77.1 241 40.5 346 0.823 0.112 0.188
Food for Life 0.24 356 0.06 241 0.12 346 0.545 0.667 0.675
Headcount girls 111 356 120 241 119 346 0.603 0.671 0.947
Headcount boys 116 356 133 241 128 346 0.434 0.595 0.773
Average point score 0.287 335 0.289 221 0.283 313 0.677 0.306 0.156
% Level 4 or > 0.838 335 0.827 221 0.752 313 0.813 0.152 0.138
Continued on next page
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Table 1 – Continued from previous page
Control N Individual N Competition N Ctrl vs Ctrl Vs Comp Vs
Ind Comp Ind
(C) (T1) (T2) C vs T1 C vs T2 T1 vs T2
in Eng/Maths
Persistent Absence 0.017 335 0.011 236 0.018 313 0.667 0.847 0.482
Absence 0.052 335 0.047 236 0.053 313 0.539 0.915 0.490
All variables are evaluated for the first week, before the start of the treatment. Choice is a dummy variable equal to
one if a pupil chose (or brought in their packed lunch) a fruit or vegetable portion on a given day. Try is a dummy
variable equal to one if the pupil eats at least some of a fruit or vegetable portion on that day. “Eat more than half”
is a dummy variable equal to one if the pupil eats at least some of a fruit or vegetable portion on that day. The first
column shows the means for the pupils in the control school in the, the second column for schools in the individual
incentive scheme and the third column in the competition schools. The fourth and fifth columns show the p-value
difference in the means of each treatment compared to the control group. The p-value were calculated, to account
for intra-school correlation, by regressing each baseline variable on one of the treatment indicators, standard errors
are clustered at the school level and due to the small number clusters we present wild bootstrapped p-values using
1000 replications which are estimated following Cameron, Gelbach, Miller (2008), the p-value is matched to the
t-statistic on the treatment dummy.
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Table 2: Effect on Choice for Overall Sample and Its Subgroups
Dependent Variable (=1) if Student Chose a Healthy Item
All Females Males FSM Non-FSM Year 2 Year 5
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7]
Competition (=1) * Week 2-5 0.045 0.059 0.026 0.071 0.045 0.057 0.023
(0.031) (0.036) (0.049) (0.065) (0.032) (0.043) (0.048)
[0.180] [0.144] [0.739] [0.352] [0.164] [0.246] [0.667]
Competition (=1) * Week 6 0.001 0.027 -0.030 0.002 0.003 0.040 -0.051
(0.034) (0.044) (0.029) (0.100) (0.029) (0.033) (0.065)
[0.955] [0.595] [0.390] [1.00] [0.889] [0.294] [0.492]
Individual Incentive (=1) * Week 2-5 0.024 0.010 0.037 -0.033 0.033 -0.066** 0.126*
(0.050) (0.045) (0.061) (0.052) (0.053) (0.027) (0.072)
[0.659] [0.863] [0.549] [0.537] [0.515] [0.034] [0.236]
Individual Incentive (=1) * Week 6 -0.045 -0.045 -0.051 -0.164 -0.027 -0.122*** 0.048
(0.059) (0.058) (0.063) (0.114) (0.059) (0.036) (0.083)
[0.567] [0.450] [0.486] [0.166] [0.701] [0.004] [0.641]
Constant 0.821*** 0.843*** 0.798*** 0.838*** 0.819*** 0.852*** 0.788***
(0.014) (0.014) (0.020) (0.021) (0.015) (0.013) (0.022)
P-Value: Comp = Ind Incentive Week 2-5 0.698 0.278 0.875 0.088 0.837 0.012 0.198
P-Value: Comp = Ind Incentive Week 2-5 (wild) 0.711 0.276 0.809 0.108 0.859 0.020 0.340
P-Value: Comp = Ind Incentive Week 6 0.415 0.218 0.733 0.071 0.606 0.000 0.273
P-Value: Comp = Ind Incentive Week 6 (wild) 0.396 0.222 0.755 0.068 0.627 0.002 0.364
Observations 15,338 7,986 7,352 2,664 12,256 8,033 7,305
R-squared 0.007 0.009 0.006 0.021 0.006 0.011 0.014
Number of pupils 638 328 310 114 509 343 295
Robust standard errors clustered at school level are included in parentheses; * sig at 10%, ** sig at 5%, *** sig at 1%. Wild P-Values are shown in
brackets and are estimated following Cameron, Gelbach, Miller (2008) using 1000 replications. Choice is a dummy variable equal to one if a pupil
chose (or brought in their packed lunch) a fruit or vegetable portion on a given day. The incentives were in place during weeks 2 to 5 (inclusive)
but were not in place during week 6. Column [2] includes only female and column [3] contains only males. Column [4] includes only pupils who are
eligible for free school meals (FSM) and column [5] contains those pupils not eligible for FSM; there are 15 pupils for whom we are missing FSM
status. Column [6] contains only pupils in Year 2 and column [7] contains only pupils in Year 5.
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Table 3: Effect on Choice for Sample with Week 1 less than 100% Choice and Its Subgroups
Dependent Variable (=1) if Student Chose a Healthy Item
All Females Males FSM Non-FSM Year 2 Year 5
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7]
Competition (=1) * Week 2-5 0.175*** 0.108 0.214*** 0.256* 0.165*** 0.157* 0.160**
(0.060) (0.081) (0.073) (0.131) (0.057) (0.076) (0.068)
[0.018] [0.302] [0.002] [0.112] [0.016] [0.176] [0.042]
Competition (=1) * Week 6 0.096** 0.058 0.111** 0.085 0.094** 0.110* 0.060
(0.043) (0.064) (0.053) (0.152) (0.037) (0.057) (0.068)
[0.048] [0.370] [0.126] [0.723] [0.020] [0.174] [0.456]
Individual Incentive (=1) * Week 2-5 0.096 -0.014 0.173* 0.027 0.088 -0.194*** 0.231***
(0.080) (0.095) (0.095) (0.188) (0.071) (0.068) (0.076)
[0.340] [0.871] [0.260] [0.847] [0.382] [0.108] [0.032]
Individual Incentive (=1) * Week 6 -0.035 -0.104 0.010 -0.298 -0.023 -0.389*** 0.109
(0.094) (0.086) (0.116) (0.351) (0.084) (0.068) (0.082)
[0.687] [0.200] [0.961] [0.727] [0.765] [0.000] [0.212]
Constant 0.517*** 0.540*** 0.495*** 0.459*** 0.527*** 0.511*** 0.523***
(0.024) (0.026) (0.030) (0.054) (0.022) (0.025) (0.025)
P-Value: Comp = Ind Incentive Week 2-5 0.371 0.170 0.721 0.260 0.348 0.000 0.383
P-Value: Comp = Ind Incentive Week 2-5 (wild) 0.428 0.168 0.755 0.490 0.346 0.014 0.468
P-Value: Comp = Ind Incentive Week 6 0.191 0.069 0.426 0.288 0.189 0.000 0.559
P-Value: Comp = Ind Incentive Week 6 (wild) 0.204 0.050 0.436 0.639 0.182 0.000 0.593
Observations 5,586 2,641 2,945 802 4,587 2,369 3,217
R-squared 0.054 0.067 0.046 0.089 0.047 0.065 0.061
Number of pupils 215 102 113 29 179 93 122
Robust standard errors clustered at school level are included in parentheses; * sig at 10%, ** sig at 5%, *** sig at 1%. Wild P-Values are shown in
brackets and are estimated following Cameron, Gelbach, Miller (2008) using 1000 replications. Choice is a dummy variable equal to one if a pupil
chose (or brought in their packed lunch) a fruit or vegetable portion on a given day. The incentives were in place during weeks 2 to 5 (inclusive)
but were not in place during week 6. Column [2] includes only female and column [3] contains only males. Column [4] includes only pupils who are
eligible for free school meals (FSM) and column [5] contains those pupils not eligible for FSM; there are 15 pupils for whom we are missing FSM
status. Column [6] contains only pupils in Year 2 and column [7] contains only pupils in Year 5.
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Table 4: Effect on Trying for Overall Sample and Its Subgroups
Dependent Variable (=1) if Student Tried a Healthy Item
All Females Males FSM Non-FSM Year 2 Year 5
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7]
Competition (=1) * Week 2-5 0.112** 0.142*** 0.073 0.195** 0.099** 0.116* 0.105*
(0.049) (0.051) (0.069) (0.088) (0.047) (0.059) (0.054)
[0.022] [0.012] [0.456] [0.080] [0.036] [0.084] [0.114]
Competition (=1) * Week 6 0.067 0.099* 0.027 0.156 0.050 0.097* 0.032
(0.050) (0.052) (0.062) (0.107) (0.043) (0.047) (0.069)
[0.210] [0.110] [0.799] [0.260] [0.282] [0.070] [0.671]
Individual Incentive (=1) * Week 2-5 0.033 0.021 0.042 -0.024 0.043 -0.073* 0.199***
(0.058) (0.053) (0.077) (0.080) (0.059) (0.041) (0.066)
[0.587] [0.707] [0.623] [0.763] [0.557] [0.124] [0.0961]
Individual Incentive (=1) * Week 6 -0.025 -0.025 -0.028 -0.125 -0.012 -0.121** 0.130
(0.072) (0.069) (0.085) (0.131) (0.068) (0.044) (0.096)
[0.869] [0.723] [0.753] [0.386] [0.855] [0.016] [0.282]
Constant 0.736*** 0.760*** 0.711*** 0.759*** 0.734*** 0.769*** 0.692***
(0.019) (0.018) (0.026) (0.028) (0.019) (0.017) (0.022)
P-Value: Comp = Ind Incentive Week 2-5 0.251 0.041 0.730 0.010 0.418 0.002 0.247
P-Value: Comp = Ind Incentive Week 2-5 (wild) 0.286 0.068 0.807 0.020 0.464 0.002 0.378
P-Value: Comp = Ind Incentive Week 6 0.164 0.054 0.484 0.012 0.323 0.000 0.256
P-Value: Comp = Ind Incentive Week 6 (wild) 0.220 0.080 0.565 0.016 0.326 0.000 0.328
Observations 14,714 7,719 6,994 2,495 11,838 7,916 6,798
R-squared 0.012 0.018 0.008 0.026 0.011 0.015 0.023
Number of pupils 638 328 310 114 509 343 295
Robust standard errors clustered at school level are included in parentheses; * sig at 10%, ** sig at 5%, *** sig at 1%. Wild P-Values are shown in
brackets and are estimated following Cameron, Gelbach, Miller (2008) using 1000 replications. Try is a dummy variable equal to one if the pupil
eats at least some of a fruit or vegetable portion on that day. The incentives were in place during weeks 2 to 5 (inclusive) but were not in place
during week 6. Column [2] includes only female and column [3] contains only males. Column [4] includes only pupils who are eligible for free school
meals (FSM) and column [5] contains those pupils not eligible for FSM; there are 15 pupils for whom we are missing FSM status. Column [6]
contains only pupils in Year 2 and column [7] contains only pupils in Year 5.
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Table 5: Effect on Try for Sample with Week 1 less than 100% Choice and Its Subgroups
Dependent Variable (=1) if Student Tried a Healthy Item
All Females Males FSM Non-FSM Year 2 Year 5
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7]
Competition (=1) * Week 2-5 0.211*** 0.158** 0.235** 0.275** 0.198*** 0.171* 0.210***
(0.066) (0.073) (0.086) (0.097) (0.067) (0.086) (0.066)
[0.002] [0.072] [0.008] [0.050] [0.004] [0.094] [0.002]
Competition (=1) * Week 6 0.141** 0.101 0.154** 0.196** 0.120** 0.170*** 0.090
(0.054) (0.080) (0.059) (0.088) (0.051) (0.057) (0.073)
[0.002] [0.220] [0.042] [0.058] [0.022] [0.008] [0.260]
Individual Incentive (=1) * Week 2-5 0.074 -0.023 0.140 0.019 0.074 -0.265*** 0.245***
(0.078) (0.079) (0.105) (0.192) (0.072) (0.056) (0.050)
[0.364] [0.821] [0.374] [0.879] [0.414] [0.008] [0.008]
Individual Incentive (=1) * Week 6 -0.020 -0.081 0.018 -0.140 -0.026 -0.352*** 0.123
(0.095) (0.091) (0.119) (0.322) (0.091) (0.057) (0.081)
[0.788] [0.454] [0.915] [0.727] [0.791] [0.006] [0.176]
Constant 0.436*** 0.458*** 0.414*** 0.357*** 0.449*** 0.416*** 0.452***
(0.025) (0.026) (0.032) (0.043) (0.024) (0.027) (0.021)
P-Value: Comp = Ind Incentive Week 2-5 0.167 0.067 0.463 0.239 0.192 0.000 0.662
P-Value: Comp = Ind Incentive Week 2-5 (wild) 0.188 0.092 0.527 0.484 0.206 0.004 0.743
P-Value: Comp = Ind Incentive Week 6 0.117 0.047 0.301 0.322 0.126 0.000 0.715
P-Value: Comp = Ind Incentive Week 6 (wild) 0.134 0.038 0.326 0.521 0.098 0.000 0.779
Observations 5,466 2,583 2,883 799 4,476 2,360 3,106
R-squared 0.066 0.083 0.053 0.107 0.058 0.083 0.070
Number of pupils 215 102 113 29 179 93 122
Robust standard errors clustered at school level are included in parentheses; * sig at 10%, ** sig at 5%, *** sig at 1%. Wild P-Values are shown in
brackets and are estimated following Cameron, Gelbach, Miller (2008) using 1000 replications. Try is a dummy variable equal to one if the pupil
eats at least some of a fruit or vegetable portion on that day. The incentives were in place during weeks 2 to 5 (inclusive) but were not in place
during week 6. Column [2] includes only female and column [3] contains only males. Column [4] includes only pupils who are eligible for free school
meals (FSM) and column [5] contains those pupils not eligible for FSM; there are 15 pupils for whom we are missing FSM status. Column [6]
contains only pupils in Year 2 and column [7] contains only pupils in Year 5.
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Table 6: Effects on Choice and Try Over Treatment
Weeks on Sample with Week 1 less than 100% Choice
Dependent Variable (=1) if Student
Chose or Tried a Healthy Item
Choice Choice Try Try
[1] [2] [3] [4]
Competition (=1) * Week 2-5 0.043 0.112 0.120 0.182
(0.085) (0.093) (0.110) (0.111)
[0.649] [0.330] [0.346] [0.192]
Individual Incentive (=1) * Week 2-5 -0.044 0.176** -0.044 0.185**
(0.200) (0.064) (0.201) (0.073)
[0.799] [0.162] [0.873] [0.242]
Constant 0.327*** 0.546*** 0.223*** 0.589***
(0.050) (0.038) (0.045) (0.042)
Days of the Week Used Wed-Fri Wed-Fri Wed-Fri Wed-Fri
Sample Used Missed Not Missed Missed Not Missed
P-Value: Comp = Ind Incentive 0.664 0.557 0.435 0.984
P-Value: Comp = Ind Incentive (wild) 0.677 0.661 0.490 1.007
Observations 876 1,982 887 1,924
R-squared 0.029 0.080 0.035 0.081
Number of pupils 158 202 157 203
Robust Standard Errors clustered at the school level are in brackets; * sig at 10%, ** sig at 5%, ***
sig at 1%. Wild P-Values are shown in brackets and are estimated following Cameron, Gelbach,
Miller (2008) using 1000 replications. Choice is a dummy variable equal to one if a pupil chose
(or brought in their packed lunch) a fruit or vegetable portion on a given day. Try is a dummy
variable equal to one if the pupil eats at least some of a fruit or vegetable portion on that day. The
incentives were in place during weeks 2 to 5 (inclusive). The sample used in this regression are
children who did not try at least some of a healthy option 100% of the time during the baseline
week. The ”Missed” sample in columns [1] and [3] includes only those children who had not eaten
any healthy times on Monday and Tuesday of the given week. The ”Not Missed” sample in column
[2] and [4] includes only those children who had eaten at least one fruit or vegetable on Monday or
Tuesday during the given week.
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Table 7: Long Run Effect on Choice for Overall Sample and Its Subgroups
Dependent Variable (=1) if Student Tried a Healthy Item
All Females Males FSM Non-FSM Year 2 Year 5
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7]
Panel A: Choice
Competition (=1) * 6 months later -0.058 -0.018 -0.104 0.045 -0.084* -0.027 -0.102
(0.057) (0.055) (0.069) (0.127) (0.047) (0.057) (0.097)
[0.358] [0.731] [0.250] [0.725] [0.149] [0.615] [0.356]
Individual Incentive (=1) * 6 months later -0.016 -0.004 -0.035 -0.121 -0.015 -0.081 0.035
(0.070) (0.053) (0.091) (0.133) (0.067) (0.060) (0.100)
[0.853] [0.490] [0.350] [0.629] [0.416] [0.150] [1.38]
P-Value: Comp = Ind Incentive 6 Months 0.492 0.806 0.360 0.0943 0.298 0.414 0.105
P-Value: Comp = Ind Incentive 6 Months (wild) 0.496 0.851 0.388 0.154 0.374 0.464 0.182
Observations 11,630 6,045 5,585 2,125 9,092 5,575 6,055
R-squared 0.013 0.013 0.015 0.023 0.014 0.012 0.023
Number of pupils 392 204 188 68 311 195 197
Panel B: Choice < 100% Choice in Week 1
Competition (=1) * 6 months later 0.055 0.089 0.020 0.237 0.009 0.042 0.044
(0.104) (0.100) (0.127) (0.258) (0.075) (0.099) (0.148)
[0.629] [0.394] [0.923] [0.432] [0.903] [0.677] [0.775]
Individual Incentive (=1) * 6 months later 0.017 -0.015 0.037 0.078 -0.010 -0.040 0.044
(0.066) (0.064) (0.082) (0.186) (0.061) (0.138) (0.110)
[0.853] [0.913] [0.749] [0.593] [0.987] [0.787] [0.793]
P-Value: Comp = Ind Incentive 6 Months 0.695 0.297 0.888 0.402 0.825 0.625 0.996
P-Value: Comp = Ind Incentive 6 Months (wild) 0.753 0.406 0.885 0.424 0.847 0.659 1.027
Observations 5,072 2,321 2,751 679 4,197 1,794 3,278
R-squared 0.051 0.058 0.052 0.108 0.044 0.065 0.055
Number of pupils 168 78 90 21 141 62 106
Robust Standard Errors clustered at the school level are in brackets; * sig at 10%, ** sig at 5%, *** sig at 1%. Wild P-Values are shown in
brackets and are estimated following Cameron, Gelbach, Miller (2008) using 1000 replications. Choice is a dummy variable equal to one if a
pupil chose (or brought in their packed lunch) a fruit or vegetable portion on a given day. The incentives were in place during weeks 2 to 5
(inclusive) but were not in place during week 6 or 6 months later.
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Table 8: Long Run Effect on Try for Overall Sample and Its Subgroups
Dependent Variable (=1) if Student Tried a Healthy Item
All Females Males FSM Non-FSM Year 2 Year 5
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7]
Panel A: Try
Competition (=1) * 6 months later -0.030 -0.009 -0.057 0.142 -0.072 -0.038 -0.022
(0.079) (0.059) (0.113) (0.151) (0.061) (0.067) (0.107)
[0.697] [0.827] [0.649] [0.370] [0.354] [0.639] [0.885]
Individual Incentive (=1) * 6 months later -0.019 -0.017 -0.023 -0.023 -0.049 -0.118 0.099
(0.092) (0.067) (0.127) (0.172) (0.080) (0.076) (0.111)
[0.819] [0.366] [0.551] [0.905] [0.358] [0.126] [1.089]
P-Value: Comp = Ind Incentive 6 Months 0.867 0.899 0.679 0.162 0.727 0.244 0.006
P-Value: Comp = Ind Incentive 6 Months (wild) 0.875 0.911 0.681 0.168 0.759 0.304 0.010
Observations 11,021 5,796 5,224 1,974 8,673 5,504 5,517
R-squared 0.016 0.018 0.013 0.018 0.019 0.012 0.033
Number of pupils 392 204 188 68 311 195 197
Panel B: Try and <100% choice in baseline week
Competition (=1) * 6 months later 0.029 0.020 0.035 0.159 -0.010 -0.006 0.036
(0.110) (0.108) (0.129) (0.175) (0.091) (0.106) (0.157)
[0.779] [0.829] [0.827] [0.434] [0.903] [0.981] [0.829]
Individual Incentive (=1) * 6 months later -0.030 -0.060 -0.015 0.119* -0.060 -0.130 0.023
(0.074) (0.080) (0.086) (0.061) (0.081) (0.125) (0.113)
[0.817] [0.607] [0.889] [0.651] [0.585] [0.432] [0.873]
P-Value: Comp = Ind Incentive 6 Months 0.547 0.412 0.693 0.809 0.582 0.406 0.907
P-Value: Comp = Ind Incentive 6 Months (wild) 0.523 0.513 0.711 0.817 0.581 0.468 0.913
Observations 4,944 2,258 2,686 678 4,076 1,793 3,151
R-squared 0.057 0.066 0.052 0.110 0.051 0.070 0.062
Number of pupils 168 78 90 21 141 62 106
Robust Standard Errors clustered at the school level are in brackets; * sig at 10%, ** sig at 5%, *** sig at 1%. Wild P-Values are shown in
brackets and are estimated following Cameron, Gelbach, Miller (2008) using 1000 replications. Try is a dummy variable equal to one if the
pupil eats at least some of a fruit or vegetable portion on that day. The incentives were in place during weeks 2 to 5 (inclusive) but were not
in place during week 6 or 6 months later.
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Table 9: Food Knowledge
Dependent Variable: Change in Food knowledge Test Score
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7]
All Females Males FSM Non-FSM Year 2 Year 5
Competition (=1) -0.041 -0.047 -0.035 -0.115** -0.025 -0.059 -0.019
(0.031) (0.040) (0.051) (0.052) (0.034) (0.048) (0.028)
[0.230] [0.256] [0.589] [0.076] [0.521] [0.204] [0.551]
Individual Incentive (=1) -0.018 -0.045 -0.005 0.005 -0.017 0.015 -0.048
(0.041) (0.053) (0.057) (0.061) (0.041) (0.062) (0.043)
[0.739] [0.442] [0.959] [0.875] [0.663] [0.851] [0.374]
Constant 0.045 0.038 0.055 0.109*** 0.028 0.049 0.039
(0.026) (0.033) (0.048) (0.030) (0.029) (0.037) (0.027)
1st Test Score 0.827 0.852 0.798 0.754 0.843 0.806 0.853
Mean of Dependent Variable 0.022 0.008 0.038 0.061 0.013 0.024 0.020
P-Value: Comp = Ind Incentive Week 2-5 0.516 0.965 0.388 0.093 0.818 0.220 0.418
P-Value: Comp = Ind Incentive Week 2-5 (wild) 0.507 1.003 0.426 0.172 0.801 0.234 0.494
Observations 302 162 140 45 247 164 138
R-squared 0.007 0.011 0.005 0.065 0.002 0.017 0.008
Robust standard errors clustered at school level are included in parentheses; * sig at 10%, ** sig at 5%, *** sig at 1%. Wild P-Values are
shown in brackets and are estimated following Cameron, Gelbach, Miller (2008) using 1000 replications.
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Table 10: Food Knowledge on Sample with Week 1 less than 100% Choice
Dependent Variable: Change in Food knowledge Test Score
All Females Males FSM Non-FSM Year 2 Year 5
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7]
Competition (=1) -0.011 -0.032 0.017 -0.133 -0.003 -0.113 0.061***
(0.039) (0.040) (0.074) (0.182) (0.044) (0.097) (0.018)
[0.793] [0.428] [0.897] [0.579] [0.945] [0.226] [0.020]
Individual Incentive (=1) -0.012 -0.076* 0.035 -0.103*** -0.017 0.044 -0.023*
(0.038) (0.038) (0.063) (0.009) (0.044) (0.125) (0.011)
[0.765] [0.136] [0.663] [0.509] [0.745] [0.819] [0.292]
Constant 0.023 0.035*** 0.013 0.032** 0.022 0.052 0.005
(0.027) (0.006) (0.046) (0.009) (0.035) (0.080) (0.005)
1st Test Score 0.847 0.872 0.821 0.848 0.854 0.798 0.874
Mean of Dependent Variable 0.015 0.001 0.030 -0.032 0.015 0.013 0.017
P-Value: Comp = Ind Incentive Week 2-5 0.963 0.431 0.802 0.875 0.730 0.178 0.002
P-Value: Comp = Ind Incentive Week 2-5 (wild) 0.987 0.484 0.751 0.935 0.753 0.222 0.006
Observations 118 60 58 12 99 42 76
R-squared 0.001 0.025 0.003 0.064 0.001 0.050 0.037
Robust standard errors clustered at school level are included in parentheses; * sig at 10%, ** sig at 5%, *** sig at 1%. Wild P-Values are
shown in brackets and are estimated following Cameron, Gelbach, Miller (2008) using 1000 replications.
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Appendix A: Experimental Materials
Figure A1: Stickers and rewards
Appendix B: Additional Figures and Tables
Not for Publication
Table 2A: Tests for Differences Between Subgroups
Column Column Column
[2] = [3] [4] = [5] [6] = [7]
Competition (=1) * Week 2-5 0.577 0.686 0.611
Competition (=1) * Week 2-5 (wild-p) 0.595 0.681 0.687
Competition (=1) * Week 6 0.164 0.985 0.216
Competition (=1) * Week 6 (wild-p) 0.186 1.019 0.240
Individual Incentive (=1) * Week 2-5 0.543 0.316 0.020
Individual Incentive (=1) * Week 2-5 (wild-p) 0.571 0.316 0.076
Individual Incentive (=1) * Week 6 0.871 0.269 0.067
Individual Incentive (=1) * Week 6 (wild-p) 0.893 0.322 0.132
First Group in Column Heading Female FSM Year 2
Second Group in Column Heading Male Non-FSM Year 5
The table contains the p-values for the tests of whether the coefficient on the variables in Table 2 for the two
columns listed are equal. Wild p-values shown are estimated following Cameron, Gelbrach, Miller (2008)
using 1000 replications. The incentives were in place during weeks 2 to 5 (inclusive) but were not in place
during week 6.
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Table 3A: Tests for Differences Between Subgroups
Column Column Column
[2] = [3] [4] = [5] [6] = [7]
Competition (=1) * Week 2-5 0.240 0.456 0.972
Competition (=1) * Week 2-5 (wild-p) 0.276 0.573 0.911
Competition (=1) * Week 6 0.473 0.951 0.570
Competition (=1) * Week 6 (wild-p) 0.529 0.907 0.637
Individual Incentive (=1) * Week 2-5 0.072 0.729 0.000
Individual Incentive (=1) * Week 2-5 (wild-p) 0.154 0.733 0.002
Individual Incentive (=1) * Week 6 0.205 0.444 0.000
Individual Incentive (=1) * Week 6 (wild-p) 0.252 0.611 0.002
First Group in Column Heading Female FSM Year 2
Second Group in Column Heading Male Non-FSM Year 5
The table contains the p-values for the tests of whether the coefficient on the variables in Table 3 for the two
columns listed are equal. Wild p-values shown are estimated following Cameron, Gelbrach, Miller (2008)
using 1000 replications. The incentives were in place during weeks 2 to 5 (inclusive) but were not in place
during week 6.
Table 4A: Tests for Differences Between Subgroups
Column Column Column
[2] = [3] [4] = [5] [6] = [7]
Competition (=1) * Week 2-5 0.324 0.204 0.831
Competition (=1) * Week 2-5 (wild-p) 0.376 0.284 0.847
Competition (=1) * Week 6 0.229 0.202 0.299
Competition (=1) * Week 6 (wild-p) 0.248 0.316 0.338
Individual Incentive (=1) * Week 2-5 0.745 0.437 0.001
Individual Incentive (=1) * Week 2-5 (wild-p) 0.775 0.452 0.020
Individual Incentive (=1) * Week 6 0.965 0.364 0.012
Individual Incentive (=1) * Week 6 (wild-p) 0.969 0.378 0.068
First Group in Column Heading Female FSM Year 2
Second Group in Column Heading Male Non-FSM Year 5
The table contains the p-values for the tests of whether the coefficient on the variables in Table 4 for the two
columns listed are equal. Wild p-values shown are estimated following Cameron, Gelbrach, Miller (2008)
using 1000 replications. The incentives were in place during weeks 2 to 5 (inclusive) but were not in place
during week 6.
46
Table 5A: Tests for Differences Between Subgroups
Column Column Column
[2] = [3] [4] = [5] [6] = [7]
Competition (=1) * Week 2-5 0.362 0.444 0.608
Competition (=1) * Week 2-5 (wild-p) 0.360 0.468 0.679
Competition (=1) * Week 6 0.528 0.441 0.292
Competition (=1) * Week 6 (wild-p) 0.601 0.513 0.324
Individual Incentive (=1) * Week 2-5 0.139 0.768 0.000
Individual Incentive (=1) * Week 2-5 (wild-p) 0.280 0.765 0.000
Individual Incentive (=1) * Week 6 0.322 0.727 0.000
Individual Incentive (=1) * Week 6 (wild-p) 0.362 0.695 0.000
First Group in Column Heading Female FSM Year 2
Second Group in Column Heading Male Non-FSM Year 5
The table contains the p-values for the tests of whether the coefficient on the variables in Table 5 for the two
columns listed are equal. Wild p-values shown are estimated following Cameron, Gelbrach, Miller (2008)
using 1000 replications. The incentives were in place during weeks 2 to 5 (inclusive) but were not in place
during week 6.
Table 7A: Tests for Differences Between Subgroups
Column Column Column
[2] = [3] [4] = [5] [6] = [7]
Competition (=1) * 6 months later 0.152 0.223 0.490
Competition (=1) * 6 months later (wild-p) 0.206 0.282 0.484
Individual Incentive (=1) * 6 months later 0.601 0.406 0.332
Individual Incentive (=1) * 6 months later (wild-p) 0.587 0.478 0.448
First Group in Column Heading Female FSM Year 2
Second Group in Column Heading Male Non-FSM Year 5
The table contains the p-values for the tests of whether the coefficient on the variables in Table 7 for the two
columns listed are equal. Wild p-values shown are estimated following Cameron, Gelbrach, Miller (2008).
The incentives were in place during weeks 2 to 5 (inclusive) but were not in place during week 6 or 6 months
later.
Table 8A: Tests for Differences Between Subgroups
Column Column Column
[2] = [3] [4] = [5] [6] = [7]
Competition (=1) * 6 months later 0.581 0.044 0.865
Competition (=1) * 6 months later (wild-p) 0.631 0.144 0.887
Individual Incentive (=1) * 6 months later 0.940 0.843 0.053
Individual Incentive (=1) * 6 months later (wild-p) 0.927 0.859 0.112
First Group in Column Heading Female FSM Year 2
Second Group in Column Heading Male Non-FSM Year 5
The table contains the p-values for the tests of whether the coefficent on the variables in Table 8 for the two
columns listed are equal. Wild p-values shown are estimated following Cameron, Gelbrach, Miller (2008)
using 1000 replications. The incentives were in place during weeks 2 to 5 (inclusive) but were not in place
during week 6 or 6 months later.
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Figure A2: Example food knowledge test
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Figure B1: Proportion of pupils eating more than half a fruit or vegetable
a) Full Sample
a) Sample with less than 100% Choice in Baseline
49
Table B1: Descriptive Statistics of Local Education Authorities
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Participate Collaborate but Did not p-value
not participate collaborate
Contacted on Friday 0.75 0.41 0.47 0.163
Contacted by J James 0.58 0.53 0.50 0.795
Household Income/100 6.10 7.23 6.72 0.138
% FSM 0.15 0.21 0.17 0.164
Number of Schools/100 2.27 1.50 1.35 0.037
% 5 Fruit & Veg a day 24.5 25.9 26.0 0.603
% Overweight & Obese reception 23.6 23.2 23.0 0.714
% Obese reception 9.94 10.4 9.74 0.330
% Overweight & Obese yr6 33.1 34.4 33.0 0.309
% Obese yr6 18.5 20.1 18.7 0.180
Smoking 25.6 24.7 24.6 0.794
Binge Drinking 20.2 17.1 18.1 0.195
Key stage 1: Avg point score 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.879
Key stage 2: Avg point score 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.894
Per pupil spending 2010/11 4307 4806 4486 0.109
% change in per pupil spending 2010/11 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.778
% LA spending change 2010/11 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 0.689
Female CEO of the council 0.25 0.31 0.25 0.859
Female Director of Children Services 0.67 0.41 0.51 0.405
Female Leader of Healthy Schools 0.75 0.88 0.82 0.659
% of Labour Councillors 0.32 0.39 0.33 0.650
% of Conservative Councillors 0.43 0.43 0.42 0.983
Labour controlled council 0.25 0.29 0.29 0.958
Conservative controlled council 0.42 0.47 0.41 0.878
Ofsted Score 2.34 2.31 2.28 0.405
Ofsted Health Score 1.69 1.72 1.70 0.707
Catering pp/100 0.80 0.83 0.82 0.989
Energy costs pp/100 0.69 0.68 0.65 0.610
Total school Income pp/1000 4.30 4.52 4.32 0.674
Teaching costs pp/1000 2.10 2.18 2.13 0.756
P-values in column 4 come from a test of equality of the 3 group means between local authorities that participated, those that collaborated (by providing names of schools), and those that did not collaborate.
Local authorities were randomly contacted on two days on Friday 2nd July and Monday 5th July and by J. James or M. Belot. Income is the average weekly total household income (£) divided by 100, FSM is the
percentage of children who are eligible for free school meals. % Eat 5 Fruit & Veg a day is the proportion of adults defined to be consumers of 5 or more fruit and vegetables if they had reported that they had
consumed 5 or more portions of fruit and vegetables on the previous day. Binge drinking is the proportion of adult binge drinkers defined if they reported that in the last week they had drunk 8 or more units
of alcohol if they were a man, or 6 or more units of alcohol if they were a woman, on any one day or more. Smoking is the proportion of individuals in a local authority who reported that they were a ‘current
cigarette smoker’ in the Health Survey for England. Overweight and Obese reception is the percentage of pupils in the local authority who were overweight or obese when they entered primary school aged 4 or 5.
Year 6 is the final year of school when the pupils are aged 10 or 11. The average point score (APS) of the key stage 1 test and key stage 2 point score are for tests taken in primary school. The points are awarded
per subject per pupil along the following lines: working below the level of the test or not awarded 15, level 2 receives 15 points, level 3 gets 21, level 4 gets 27 and 33 points is allocated for level 5. The APS is then
calculated using the following: (Total points for English + Total points for maths + Total points for science) / (Total number of eligible pupils for each subject). This is then rescaled by dividing by 100. Per pupil
spending in 2010/11, the yearly increase in per pupil spending, and the overall change in the spending of the local authority. Labour Party and Conservative Party councillors on the council defined at the most
recent election since July 2010. Ofsted is (the government school inspector) average score of the schools in the local authority. Schools are inspected and judged on the following question: “How effective, efficient
and inclusive is the provision of education, integrated care and any extended services in meeting the needs of learners?” With ratings given of: 1. Outstanding 2. Good 3. Satisfactory 4. Inadequate. Ofsted
Health Score is based on the following question: “Learners are encouraged and enabled to eat and drink healthily” using the same 1 to 4 scale. Average catering costs (including staff costs), energy, teaching and
total school income are per pupil averages at the local authority level and are rescaled as indicated.
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Table B2 Comparison of participating schools from the pool of selected schools
Experiment Dropped p-value of difference
% Girls 0.48 0.49 0.802
Number of pupils 207 279 0.322
% FSM Eligible 15.9 15.8 0.849
% FSM Take 13.9 13.7 0.802
Total School Income per pupil/1000 4.17 4.16 0.641
Absenteeism (% on census day) 0.05 0.05 0.682
Catering costs per pupil/100 0.96 0.73 0.303
% English and Maths above level 4 KS2 0.76 0.76 0.949
Average point score Maths and English 0.28 0.28 0.396
Food for life 0.31 0.21 0.501
Ofsted Score 2.09 2.29 0.521
Ofsted health Score 1.53 1.43 0.604
FSM Medium 0.29 0.29 0.975
FSM Low 0.65 0.64 0.988
Teaching Costs per pupil/1000 2.05 2.17 0.246
Energy costs per pupil/100 0.64 0.87 0.961
Competition treatment 0.29 0.43 0.368
Individual treatment 0.32 0.36 0.822
Control 0.39 0.21 0.260
Schools 31 15
Columns 1 and 2 show the mean values at the school level. Column 3 is the p-value of (Prob>z, where z is the test statistic)
from an Mann-Whitney U test. Ofsted is (the government school inspector) average score of the schools in the local authority.
Schools are inspected and judged on the following question: “How effective, efficient and inclusive is the provision of education,
integrated care and any extended services in meeting the needs of learners?” With ratings given of: 1. Outstanding 2. Good
3. Satisfactory 4. Inadequate. Ofsted Health Score is based on the following question: “Learners are encouraged and enabled
to eat and drink healthily” using the same 1 to 4 scale. Average catering costs (including staff costs), energy, teaching and
total school income are per pupil averages at the local authority level and are rescaled as indicated. FSM Band - The three
broad bands used to group pupils eligible for FSM are: Low: less than 20%, Medium: 20.01-35% and High: greater than
35% (omitted catergory). Columns (1)-(3) present estimates using whether a school was selected by the LEA. Column (3)
excludes “Avg Eng/Math Score” but uses the same sample in column (2). Column (4) and (5) use whether a school started
and completed the experimental intervention.
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Table B3: Effect on Eating More than Half for Overall Sample and Its Subgroups
Dependent Variable (=1) if Student Ate More than Half a Healthy Item
All Females Males FSM Non-FSM Year 2 Year 5
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7]
Competition (=1) * Week 2-5 0.114* 0.129 0.096 0.107 0.120 0.096 0.133**
(0.063) (0.084) (0.079) (0.086) (0.072) (0.108) (0.063)
[0.194] [0.178] [0.288] [0.272] [0.144] [0.438] [0.070]
Competition (=1) * Week 6 0.082 0.099 0.061 0.124 0.078 0.108 0.062
(0.073) (0.104) (0.073) (0.086) (0.088) (0.111) (0.083)
[0.354] [0.416] [0.490] [0.168] [0.420] [0.418] [0.505]
Individual Incentive (=1) * Week 2-5 0.054 0.051 0.053 0.008 0.057 -0.054 0.219***
(0.060) (0.076) (0.067) (0.072) (0.066) (0.072) (0.048)
[0.464] [0.561] [0.438] [0.927] [0.452] [0.498] [0.014]
Individual Incentive (=1) * Week 6 0.008 0.040 -0.023 -0.010 0.005 -0.068 0.143
(0.075) (0.091) (0.078) (0.101) (0.083) (0.083) (0.090)
[0.893] [0.695] [0.813] [0.915] [0.989] [0.488] [0.172]
Constant 0.599*** 0.628*** 0.567*** 0.592*** 0.606*** 0.602*** 0.588***
(0.022) (0.029) (0.026) (0.029) (0.025) (0.032) (0.021)
P-Value: Comp = Ind Incentive Week 2-5 0.410 0.356 0.638 0.320 0.437 0.109 0.193
P-Value: Comp = Ind Incentive Week 2-5 (wild) 0.488 0.428 0.687 0.360 0.460 0.164 0.256
P-Value: Comp = Ind Incentive Week 6 0.327 0.502 0.340 0.212 0.387 0.049 0.294
P-Value: Comp = Ind Incentive Week 6 (wild) 0.446 0.607 0.390 0.256 0.444 0.054 0.352
Observations 14,714 7,719 6,994 2,495 11,838 7,916 6,798
R-squared 0.012 0.012 0.013 0.010 0.011 0.009 0.025
Number of pupils 638 328 310 114 509 343 295
Robust standard errors clustered at school level are included in parentheses; * sig at 10%, ** sig at 5%, *** sig at 1%. Wild P-Values are shown in brackets
and are estimated following Cameron, Gelbach, Miller (2008). “Eat more than half” is a dummy variable equal to one if the pupil eats at least half of a portion
of fruits or vegetables on that day. The incentives were in place during weeks 2 to 5 (inclusive) but were not in place during week 6. Column [2] includes
only female and column [3] contains only males. Column [4] includes only pupils who are eligible for free school meals (FSM) and column [5] contains those
pupils not eligible for FSM; there are 15 pupils for whom we are missing FSM status. Column [6] contains only pupils in Year 2 and column [7] contains
only pupils in Year 5.
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Table B4: Effect on Eating More Than Half for Sample with Week 1 less than 100% Choice and Its Subgroups
Dependent Variable (=1) if Student Ate Mopre than Half a Healthy Item
All Females Males FSM Non-FSM Year 2 Year 5
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7]
Competition (=1) * Week 2-5 0.190** 0.145 0.218** 0.268** 0.175** 0.141 0.203**
(0.076) (0.095) (0.088) (0.114) (0.076) (0.100) (0.087)
[0.024] [0.178] [0.042] [0.104] [0.038] [0.230] [0.036]
Competition (=1) * Week 6 0.117* 0.074 0.143** 0.245** 0.086 0.119 0.094
(0.066) (0.102) (0.064) (0.095) (0.068) (0.069) (0.099)
[0.126] [0.501] [0.052] [0.058] [0.288] [0.172] [0.404]
Individual Incentive (=1) * Week 2-5 0.078 0.001 0.130 0.096 0.061 -0.193*** 0.216***
(0.068) (0.091) (0.082) (0.171) (0.069) (0.063) (0.063)
[0.318] [0.973] [0.292] [0.695] [0.466] [0.016] [0.008]
Individual Incentive (=1) * Week 6 -0.006 -0.024 0.003 0.049 -0.030 -0.326*** 0.133
(0.096) (0.102) (0.118) (0.272) (0.097) (0.073) (0.106)
[0.979] [0.795] [0.979] [0.617] [0.773] [0.004] [0.270]
Constant 0.342*** 0.372*** 0.314*** 0.231*** 0.363*** 0.291*** 0.381***
(0.025) (0.030) (0.029) (0.047) (0.025) (0.031) (0.027)
P-value for Competition=Individual for Wks 2-5 0.199 0.104 0.420 0.391 0.183 0.001 0.883
P-value for Competition=Individual for Wks 2-5 (wild) 0.220 0.134 0.513 0.511 0.228 0.008 0.879
P-value for Competition=Individual for Wk 6 0.166 0.121 0.274 0.507 0.156 0.000 0.692
P-value for Competition=Individual for Wk 6 (wild) 0.210 0.110 0.322 0.555 0.124 0.000 0.665
Observations 5,466 2,583 2,883 799 4,476 2,360 3,106
R-squared 0.057 0.065 0.052 0.082 0.051 0.072 0.058
Number of pupils 215 102 113 29 179 93 122
Robust standard errors clustered at school level are included in parentheses; * sig at 10%, ** sig at 5%, *** sig at 1%. Wild P-Values are shown in brackets and
are estimated following Cameron, Gelbach, Miller (2008). “Eat more than half” is a dummy variable equal to one if the pupil eats at least half of a portion of fruits
or vegetables on that day. The incentives were in place during weeks 2 to 5 (inclusive) but were not in place during week 6. Column [2] includes only female and
column [3] contains only males. Column [4] includes only pupils who are eligible for free school meals (FSM) and column [5] contains those pupils not eligible for
FSM; there are 15 pupils for whom we are missing FSM status. Column [6] contains only pupils in Year 2 and column [7] contains only pupils in Year 5.
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Table B5: Effect on Attendance On Overall Sample and Its Subgroups
Dependent Variable (=1) if Student Attended School
All Females Males FSM Non-FSM Year 2 Year 5
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7]
Competition (=1) * Week 2-5 0.017 0.002 0.037* 0.029 0.015 0.021 0.016
(0.014) (0.021) (0.018) (0.051) (0.016) (0.017) (0.021)
[0.276] [0.897] [0.068] [0.621] [0.396] [0.304] [0.559]
Competition (=1) * Week 6 -0.009 -0.023 0.014 -0.014 -0.006 -0.011 -0.004
(0.017) (0.026) (0.020) (0.061) (0.015) (0.027) (0.028)
[0.655] [0.412] [0.474] [0.811] [0.675] [0.645] [0.833]
Individual Incentive (=1) * Week 2-5 0.023 0.009 0.040* 0.002 0.029 0.015 0.032
(0.022) (0.029) (0.023) (0.042) (0.026) (0.018) (0.037)
[0.414] [0.783] [0.116] [0.931] [0.306] [0.444] [0.482]
Individual Incentive (=1) * Week 6 -0.022 -0.031 -0.007 -0.061* -0.007 -0.007 -0.035
(0.048) (0.050) (0.050) (0.032) (0.049) (0.020) (0.099)
[0.733] [0.581] [0.937] [0.104] [0.865] [0.717] [0.809]
Constant 0.945*** 0.945*** 0.946*** 0.971*** 0.938*** 0.956*** 0.934***
(0.007) (0.009) (0.008) (0.014) (0.008) (0.007) (0.013)
P-value for Competition=Individual for Wks 2-5 0.800 0.814 0.877 0.411 0.551 0.790 0.634
P-value for Competition=Individual for Wks 2-5 (wild) 0.831 0.859 0.917 0.482 0.579 0.837 0.689
Observations 16,472 8,548 7,917 2,843 13,200 8,596 7,876
R-squared 0.003 0.002 0.004 0.009 0.002 0.001 0.007
Number of pupils 643 331 312 115 513 345 298
Robust standard errors clustered at school level are included in parentheses; * sig at 10%, ** sig at 5%, *** sig at 1%. Wild P-Values are shown
in brackets and are estimated following Cameron, Gelbach, Miller (2008). Column [2] includes only female and column [3] contains only males.
Column [4] includes only pupils who are eligible for free school meals (FSM) and column [5] contains those pupils not eligible for FSM; there are
15 pupils for whom we are missing FSM status. Column [6] contains only pupils in Year 2 and column [7] contains only pupils in Year 5.
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Table B6: Effect on Attendance for Sample with Week 1 less than 100% Choice and Its Subgroups
Dependent Variable (=1) if Student Attended School
All Females Males FSM Non-FSM Year 2 Year 5
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7]
Competition (=1) * Week 2-5 -0.015 -0.063 0.030 0.046** -0.025 -0.032 0.011
(0.023) (0.037) (0.027) (0.019) (0.028) (0.038) (0.034)
[0.563] [0.322] [0.380] [0.076] [0.424] [0.424] [0.785]
Competition (=1) * Week 6 -0.062** -0.130*** 0.010 -0.003 -0.067** -0.081* -0.034
(0.022) (0.041) (0.034) (0.036) (0.029) (0.042) (0.036)
[0.034] [0.04] [0.765] [0.777] [0.070] [0.054] [0.394]
Individual Incentive (=1) * Week 2-5 0.062 0.041 0.078** 0.040*** 0.065 0.057 0.063
(0.040) (0.060) (0.035) (0.005) (0.044) (0.070) (0.048)
[0.204] [0.533] [0.066] [0.124] [0.208] [0.440] [0.386]
Individual Incentive (=1) * Week 6 0.045 -0.020 0.091** -0.100 0.059 0.028 0.053
(0.041) (0.071) (0.042) (0.059) (0.044) (0.096) (0.034)
[0.266] [0.823] [0.014] [0.507] [0.206] [0.789] [0.240]
Constant 0.909*** 0.901*** 0.915*** 0.980*** 0.894*** 0.931*** 0.892***
(0.010) (0.014) (0.011) (0.007) (0.012) (0.016) (0.014)
P-value for Competition=Individual for Wks 2-5 0.0443 0.0496 0.256 0.757 0.0324 0.163 0.233
P-value for Competition=Individual for Wks 2-5 (wild) 0.130 0.228 0.306 0.785 0.136 0.150 0.430
Observations 6,085 2,870 3,210 838 5,047 2,582 3,503
R-squared 0.008 0.016 0.006 0.014 0.010 0.006 0.011
Number of pupil 220 105 115 30 183 95 125
Robust standard errors clustered at school level are included in parentheses; * sig at 10%, ** sig at 5%, *** sig at 1%. Wild P-Values are shown
in brackets and are estimated following Cameron, Gelbach, Miller (2008). Column [2] includes only female and column [3] contains only males.
Column [4] includes only pupils who are eligible for free school meals (FSM) and column [5] contains those pupils not eligible for FSM; there are
15 pupils for whom we are missing FSM status. Column [6] contains only pupils in Year 2 and column [7] contains only pupils in Year 5.
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Table B7: Effect on Bringing Packed Lunch On Overall Sample and Its Subgroups
Dependent Variable (=1) if Student Brought a Packed Lunch
All Females Males FSM Non-FSM Year 2 Year 5
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7]
Competition (=1) * Week 2-5 0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.014 0.001 0.008 -0.014
(0.021) (0.032) (0.023) (0.039) (0.025) (0.034) (0.025)
[0.993] [0.995] [0.957] [0.737] [0.951] [0.849] [0.635]
Competition (=1) * Week 6 -0.038 -0.065 -0.003 0.008 -0.042 -0.063 -0.020
(0.030) (0.046) (0.033) (0.044) (0.038) (0.043) (0.036)
[0.220] [0.176] [0.923] [0.883] [0.332] [0.202] [0.621]
Individual Incentive (=1) * Week 2-5 -0.013 -0.001 -0.022 -0.038* 0.004 -0.014 -0.014
(0.025) (0.035) (0.020) (0.021) (0.024) (0.033) (0.037)
[0.569] [1.02] [0.394] [0.200] [0.827] [0.681] [0.815]
Individual Incentive (=1) * Week 6 -0.041 -0.037 -0.040 -0.057 -0.021 -0.078* -0.008
(0.036) (0.052) (0.029) (0.042) (0.036) (0.043) (0.055)
[0.256] [0.509] [0.268] [0.258] [0.587] [0.128] [0.919]
Constant 0.499*** 0.489*** 0.511*** 0.187*** 0.566*** 0.461*** 0.539***
(0.008) (0.011) (0.008) (0.013) (0.009) (0.009) (0.012)
P-value for Competition=Individual for Wks 2-5 0.525 0.968 0.421 0.255 0.919 0.0684 0.996
P-value for Competition=Individual for Wks 2-5 (wild) 0.583 1.035 0.482 0.306 0.865 0.092 0.957
Observations 14,575 7,622 6,953 2,501 11,671 7,348 7,227
R-squared 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.004 0.002 0.003 0.002
Number of pupils 623 322 301 110 498 329 294
Robust standard errors clustered at school level are included in parentheses; * sig at 10%, ** sig at 5%, *** sig at 1%. Wild P-Values are shown
in brackets and are estimated following Cameron, Gelbach, Miller (2008). Column [2] includes only female and column [3] contains only males.
Column [4] includes only pupils who are eligible for free school meals (FSM) and column [5] contains those pupils not eligible for FSM; there are
15 pupils for whom we are missing FSM status. Column [6] contains only pupils in Year 2 and column [7] contains only pupils in Year 5.
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Table B8: Effect on Bringing Packed Lunch for Sample with Week 1 less than 100% Choice and Its Subgroups
Dependent Variable (=1) if Student Brought a Packed Lunch
All Females Males FSM Non-FSM Year 2 Year 5
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7]
Competition (=1) * Week 2-5 0.007 -0.021 0.040 0.033 -0.000 0.020 -0.019
(0.023) (0.040) (0.026) (0.118) (0.023) (0.029) (0.041)
[0.719] [0.641] [0.124] [0.783] [0.991] [0.543] [0.657]
Competition (=1) * Week 6 -0.004 -0.076 0.080** -0.006 0.003 -0.039 0.005
(0.036) (0.071) (0.030) (0.121) (0.043) (0.071) (0.058)
[0.957] [0.348] [0.032] [0.985] [0.971] [0.515] [0.925]
Individual Incentive (=1) * Week 2-5 0.036 0.054* 0.022 0.007 0.053* 0.060 0.027
(0.025) (0.030) (0.038) (0.005) (0.028) (0.054) (0.022)
[0.204] [0.182] [0.643] [0.430] [0.072] [0.595] [0.408]
Individual Incentive (=1) * Week 6 0.018 0.044 -0.003 -0.017 0.048 -0.039 0.050
(0.046) (0.076) (0.041) (0.014) (0.041) (0.072) (0.057)
[0.751] [0.651] [0.941] [0.505] [0.350] [0.527] [0.645]
Constant 0.532*** 0.527*** 0.536*** 0.355*** 0.564*** 0.509*** 0.549***
(0.009) (0.015) (0.011) (0.042) (0.009) (0.013) (0.012)
P-value for Competition=Individual for Wks 2-5 0.318 0.0518 0.646 0.825 0.0749 0.466 0.262
P-value for Competition=Individual for Wks 2-5 (wild) 0.384 0.112 0.697 0.821 0.100 0.781 0.302
Observations 5,376 2,555 2,821 771 4,412 2,195 3,181
R-squared 0.001 0.004 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.004 0.002
Number of pupils 214 102 112 29 178 93 121
Robust standard errors clustered at school level are included in parentheses; * sig at 10%, ** sig at 5%, *** sig at 1%. Wild P-Values are shown
in brackets and are estimated following Cameron, Gelbach, Miller (2008). Column [2] includes only female and column [3] contains only males.
Column [4] includes only pupils who are eligible for free school meals (FSM) and column [5] contains those pupils not eligible for FSM; there are
15 pupils for whom we are missing FSM status. Column [6] contains only pupils in Year 2 and column [7] contains only pupils in Year 5.
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